

The British

Historical Review

VOLUME 1

AUTUMN 2016

JAIDEEP BHANOT	<i>Hus and Luther: Same Men in Different Eras? Could Reform have Surfaced Earlier?</i>	1-13
IMOGEN CRARER	<i>Female agency and the ANZAC legend: grief and commemoration in Australia during the inter-war years</i>	14-31
SUSANNAH FITZGERALD	<i>The Political and Economic Response of the Jewish communities of Glasgow and Manchester to the Nazi Regime in 1933-1939</i>	32-51
MATTHEW MCGINN	<i>The United States' Influence on British Foreign Policy 1895-1939</i>	52-62
ANA VUJANIC	<i>Anti-Semitic policies of Vichy government – a reflection of the 'hidden' anti-Semitism of the French people?</i>	63-79
KATIE WHITE	<i>Conceptualisation and Advertisement in the Bolshevik Campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church, 1918-1922</i>	80-110

The British Historical Review

VOLUME I | AUTUMN 2016

Editor-in-Chief

Matthew James Norris

Deputy Editor

Chloe Wilson

Design Editor

Michael James Bevan

BU
HA

The British Historical Review

All rights reserved.

© 2016 British Undergraduate Historical Association, and the authors.

No part of *The British Historical Review* may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means (graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, taping, recording or by any other information storage and retrieval system) without written permission from the University of Reading Philosophy Society, and the authors.

While every effort has been taken to make sure that all works are properly referenced and that all permissions are granted, the British Undergraduate Historical Association, *The British Historical Review* and its editors accept no responsibility for the failure of any of the authors to obtain the appropriate permissions.

The views and opinions expressed within this publication do not necessarily represent those of the British Undergraduate Historical Association or its affiliates, nor of any member of *The British Historical Review's* editorial staff. The views expressed herein strictly belong to the authors that express them.

Contents

Foreword	i
<i>Matthew James Norris</i>	
Hus and Luther: Same Men in Different Eras? Could Reform have Surfaced Earlier?	1
<i>Jaideep Bhanot</i>	
Female agency and the ANZAC legend: grief and commemoration in Australia during the inter-war years	14
<i>Imogen Crarer</i>	
The Political and Economic Response of the Jewish communities of Glasgow and Manchester to the Nazi Regime in 1933-1939	32
<i>Susannah Fitzgerald</i>	
The United States' Influence on British Foreign Policy 1895-1939	52
<i>Matthew McGinn</i>	
Anti-Semitic policies of Vichy government – a reflection of the 'hidden' anti-Semitism of the French people?	63
<i>Ana Vujanic</i>	
Conceptualisation and Advertisement in the Bolshevik Campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church, 1918-1922	80
<i>Katie White</i>	

Foreword

It is an honour and a privilege to be able to write a foreword for the inaugural issue of *The British Historical Review*, a journal of the British Undergraduate Historical Association (BUHA). The Association exists to facilitate and nurture the academic research skills of undergraduate historians at UK universities, and the contents of this publication attests to the importance of such a project through revealing the talent and potential of some of Britain's finest young historians. As editor, I can testify that what you read here is just a selection of the many excellent papers we received.

Until 2015, there existed no dedicated and active national medium for young historians in the UK to share their ideas and research, and it was a great privilege to be able to contribute to establishing the BUHA and the *Review* as a means of doing that. It is my hope that the BUHA will continue to grow and become the first port of call to aspiring historians across the United Kingdom. We have sought to be as inclusive as possible, so as to nurture the many diverse historical interests that people have, by allowing submissions on any topic of history from the medieval era onwards. This decision, of course, gave rise to many reservations, but I trust that this issue will serve as a vindication of the decision to allow diversity in content and formatting.

As with all projects, this one would not have come to fruition were it not for the efforts and encouragements of certain individuals and organisations. For her efforts in the logistics and planning, I would like to thank our deputy editor Chloe Wilson for her excellent work. Likewise, gratitude is due to Michael J. Bevan, editor-in-chief of the national undergraduate philosophy journal *Laterális*, for substantial contributions to the typesetting and style of the *Review*. Credit for the survival of BUHA and *The British Historical Review* is due in part to the on-going support of the British Historical Association (especially CEO Rebecca Sullivan). All of these contributions have been invaluable in helping the BUHA realise its vision, and we are immensely grateful for them.

In the following pages, I trust you will be as impressed as I am with the quality of research and insight offered by these budding scholars.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "M J Norris". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized 'M' and 'N'.

Matthew James Norris
President, British Undergraduate Historical Association
Editor-in-chief, *The British Historical Review*

Hus and Luther: Same Men in Different Eras? Could Reform have Surfaced Earlier?

Jaideep Bhanot

Royal Holloway

History has a habit of repeating itself and certain periods resemble striking parallels. Martin Luther nailing his Ninety-Five Theses on the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg in October 1517, famously, ignited the Protestant Reformation, echoing a new religious atmosphere throughout Western Europe. Luther, towards the beginning of the Reformation, never intended to or expected his Theses to be so controversial and for the movement to spiral the way it did. The Reformation was an incredible movement; it enabled new theology and radical political ideas to flourish, breaking the continuity from the medieval Church. However, could the Reformation have taken place roughly a century before Luther? It appears bold, yet reasonable, to argue that the Reformation could have followed a very similar path to that of Luther's, with Jan Hus as the alternate protagonist. Hus, like Luther, a devout Catholic priest striving to unveil the essence of the Christian faith. Had Hus prevailed, reforms would have sculpted a new, more pious Catholic Church. Hus's reformation would have been milder, more of an internal Catholic reformation. Hus and Luther in many ways can be seen as synonymous. Hus, like Luther, shared an almost identical mind-set. Neither wanted to break with the Church, their focus was driven towards the spiritual welfare of their parishioners because the Church was not fulfilling its spiritual duties; it was too caught up in secular affairs within the realm of European politics.

Hus and Luther's theological concerns illustrate continuity as Hus proposed some of the theological reforms Luther later reinforced. In 1519, Luther was introduced to Hus at Leipzig Castle in a debate with Johannes Eck and went as far as agreeing with the beliefs of a condemned heretic. Writing to George Spalatin, a fellow lecturer at the University of Wittenberg, Luther openly claimed "I have hitherto taught and held all

the opinions of Hus without knowing it”¹. Luther notably reconsidered the Catholic understanding of justification after studying Romans. For Luther, faith was a gift from God and all one needs to do is remain faithful in God’s promise that one will be saved. Nothing else can achieve salvation and this emerged the nucleus for Lutheran theology. Hus too shared such a stance. It was not identical to Luther’s, but faith in God was still crucial to Hus. If one believes in and loves God, that is the path to righteousness. Both men underpinned their theological bases through the importance of scripture; scripture was the Word of God and thus the source of all spiritual truth. Therefore, this marked a turning point for both reformers, since this notion made the sacraments, saints and traditional Catholic ritual redundant. Along with this, scripture needed to be accessible and understood by the laity to ensure genuine devotion. Both men, therefore, demanded that vernacular language be used for the sake of the laity’s salvation. In purely theological terms, there is little that differentiates the two men. The core elements of their theology differ ever so slightly buttressing the potential Hus had to reform the Church.

The late medieval and early modern Church was a corrupt, authoritative institution governed absolutely by the pope. As well as this, the corruption found at the top certainly filtered through to the bishops and local ranks of the clergy, both in Hus and Luther’s respective periods. The Church was claiming secular authority that was not ordained by Christ and there was no scriptural evidence to support the Church’s legal status. Both Luther and Hus were critical of the amoral nature of the Church and both men refuted the indulgences traditionally issued by the pope. In Hus’s case, Pope John XXIII issued the selling of indulgences for his crusading bull in 1411² and Pope Leo X required funds to rebuild St Peter’s Basilica in Rome³. Indulgences, in the case of both men, marked the beginning of the developing conflict between Pope and reformer.

¹ As quoted in: John Hus, *The Letters of John Hus*, ed. H. B. Workman and R. M. Pope (London, 1904), 1-2.

² M. Spinka, *John Hus: A Biography* (Princeton, 1968), 132.

³ C.S. Dixon, *The Reformation in Germany* (Oxford, 2002), 22.

There is a strong degree of religious cohesion between Hus and Luther. So what hindered Hus from initiating his own reformation of the Church? Luther was fortunate, as his immediate socio-political context greatly favoured him. Luther was operating in a nationalistic Germany that loathed the Papacy's secular goals. It was easy for Luther to play on this nationalistic sentiment, to gather support from the German localities and princes. In addition to this, Luther's great patron was Elector Frederick of Saxony, a powerful figure in European politics, who was able to secure him safe conduct when summoned to hearings. In the case of Luther's summoning to Rome in 1518, Elector Frederick was able to intervene by keeping Luther's hearing with Cardinal Cajetan in Augsburg instead. Luther's Germany, contrary to Hus's Bohemia, was simply more developed, as urban Germany had a highly literate population. Because of this, along with the growth in printing, Luther's writings were circulated and understood by thousands. When comparing Luther's immediate environment with Hus's, Hus really had little room to manoeuvre. Hus was proposing reforms in the midst of the Papal Schism where multiple popes were claiming sovereignty. The Schism was to be put to rest at the Council of Constance with the rise of the conciliar movement that aimed to make the pope subordinate to the General Council. Therefore, for Hus, a man questioning the sacred evidence of such an institution his burning was almost inevitable. If Hus had been afforded the conditions which enabled Luther to pilot his reform, Hus could have been the arbiter of great reform.

The theological and ecclesiastical concerns of the two reformers must be addressed to examine whether Hus's reforms showed promise in paving a similar path to that of Luther's reformation. Internal reform was a desire shared by both Hus and Luther because the Church was not pulling its weight as a spiritual institution. It prioritised secular matters above its primary concern that was the spiritual welfare of the Catholic laity. The core of Lutheran theology was the doctrine of justification by faith and the theology that was later to come could be traced back to this evangelical doctrine.⁴ Luther had his spiritual awakening, following years of personal torment to rid him of

⁴ Dixon, *Reformation*, 45.

sin, by reading Augustine and Romans and coming to the conclusion that faith was a gift from God, thus marking the departure from the medieval Catholic understanding of justification and the cycle of worship.⁵ After stumbling on Romans 1:17, “For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith, as it is written, the just shall live by faith”, Luther understood that to remove sin, one cannot do anything and one does not know if he is to be saved. All one has to do is to have faith in God’s promise of salvation, “If you have a true faith that Christ is your Saviour, then at once you have a gracious God”.⁶ Luther writes to George Spenlein, a fellow Augustinian, in 1516 explaining true righteousness,

For, at present, the temptation to rest in one’s own works is very powerful, especially with those who long to be good and pious. They are ignorant of God’s righteousness, which has been so richly bestowed on us in Christ without money and price.⁷

Luther, after reading Romans, rejected the Catholic tradition of active faith and good works, and makes reference to the financial element that faith cannot be purchased which he attacks more vigorously when tackling the issue of indulgences.

Scripture underpinned evangelical theology; the significance Luther attributed to scripture raised doubts over medieval Catholic doctrine, the medieval interpretation of the Bible and the legality of the Church as a secular institution. The Word of God became the base of all Lutheran thought; anything that deterred from scripture was not true and this notion is evident in late medieval humanism with the reliance on scripture and desire to return the Church to its initial state as ordained by Christ. Luther wanted to sift the Christian faith back to its bare essentials and a powerful understanding of

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Luther, as quoted in: R.H. Bainton, *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther* (New York, 1950), 50.

⁷ M. Luther, ‘To George Spenlein, Augustinian in Memmingen’, in: Martin Luther, *The Letters of Martin Luther*, ed. M.A. Currie (London, 1908), 5.

scripture revealed the path to righteousness.⁸ Therefore, through this, Luther rendered many of the traditional Catholic elements (ritual, ceremony, saints, confession and the Mass) unessential and Luther put forward this idea in *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* in 1520 by saying, “Their claim that only the pope may interpret scripture is an outrageous fancied fable”.⁹ The sacraments had been an integral aspect of Catholic theology but to Luther there was no scriptural evidence to support all seven. Only the Eucharist and baptism are evident in scripture,

[T]he sacrament itself is not in itself so necessary ... It is mere folly to squabble about such trifles as those which for the most part engage our attention, while we neglect things truly precious and salutary.¹⁰

The Catholic celebration of the Mass and the emphasis on the sacraments diverted the attention of the laity from the Word of God. Luther’s reliance upon scripture influenced his thoughts on the legitimacy of the pope and Papacy and the temporal position of the clergy. Luther utilized scripture to undermine the authority of the pope during his debate with Eck in 1519. Luther stated that the Papacy was a recent, human creation because the Papal Office had not always been recognised as the successor of Peter. Therefore, “we cannot admit that all the sheep of Christ were committed to Peter”, Christ “did not mean, did he, that no one else can feed them without Peter’s permission?”¹¹ The prerogatives the Papacy traditionally claimed are derived from a misinterpretation of scripture. Revising scripture affected the secular position of the clergy too, because salvation was a gift from God. The clergy, therefore, were no longer required to act as an intercessor on earth. Traditionally, the clergy were regarded as a distinct social group, granted certain civic privileges such as being exempt from taxation. However, Luther’s revision of scripture changed the rank of the clergy. At

⁸ Dixon, *Reformation*, 44.

⁹ M. Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, as quoted in: Dixon, *Reformation*, 47.

¹⁰ Luther, as quoted in: M. Michelet, *The Life of Martin Luther* (London, 1846), 132.

¹¹ Luther during Eck debate, as quoted in: Michelet, *Life*, 83.

baptism, everyone was declared a priest, the clergy had no scriptural base to support their secular claims. Through baptism, everyone is declared a priest and is thus equal under God.¹²

Luther's posting of his Ninety-Five Theses was an attempt to spark debate and to question the power and efficacy of indulgences.¹³ As the indulgences controversy expanded so did Luther's ideas about the nature of the Church and the doctrines that encompassed it and these certainly provoked Luther into questioning the corruption that was so prominent in the Church. Luther wanted to discover what true righteousness and piety were comprised of, not only for the sake of his soul but also for the wider laity, and a bishop or priest unwilling to perform his duties threatened the spiritual welfare of the laity. Indulgences to Luther were not a means of attaining salvation, as faith could not be purchased and the Papacy were in no position to distribute faith through such means, "the Indulgence was only pure deception of the Papal flatterers through which faith in God was destroyed".¹⁴ Luther articulated this idea in his letter to the Archbishop of Mainz in 1517 by arguing that indulgences have a "false meaning, which the simple folk attach to it, the poor souls believing that when they have purchased such letters they have secured their salvation".¹⁵ Moreover, Luther, in his Theses questioned the duties of the Church because the primary aim of the selling of indulgences was to fund the building project in Rome. Luther is found to have said in his Theses,

The revenues of all Christendom are being sucked into this insatiable basilica ... We Germans cannot attend St. Peter's ... The pope would do better to appoint one good pastor to a church than confer indulgences upon them all.¹⁶

¹² Dixon, *Reformation*, 51.

¹³ R.E. McNally, 'The Ninety-Five Theses of Martin Luther', *Theological Studies* 28 (1967), 439-480.

¹⁴ M. Luther, 'To Hermann Tulich, Professor in Wittenberg', in: Currie (ed.), *Letters*, 56.

¹⁵ M. Luther, 'To Albrecht of Mayence', in: Martin Luther, *The Letters of Martin Luther*, ed. M.A. Currie (London, 1908), 18.

¹⁶ Extract from Luther's Ninety-Five Theses, as quoted in: Bainton, *Here I Stand*, 61.

Luther in his Theses is really pushing the fact that indulgences are issued with the intention of benefitting the building project, the souls of the laity are not being considered at all.

What were Hus's main theological reforms and did they differ much from Luther's? The central components of Hus's theology resemble marked similarities. Faith underpinned Lutheran theology and similar sentiment is found in Hus's theology too. The two doctrines of faith are not, in technical terms, identical but the core concept of having faith in God and that God will fulfil his promise of saving the elect is a notion shared by both reformers. Faith to Hus is 'fundamental to the entire spiritual life of Christians' and it consists of believing in the invisible verities, to accept, love and believe *in* God.¹⁷ This idea of having true faith in God's love and promise are found in Hus's most significant work, *Exposition of the Faith*. Hus's observations regarding the true Christian faith were derived from the extensive study of scripture. Similar to Luther, Hus gradually departed from official Church doctrine the more accustomed he got with the Word of God. Therefore, identical to Luther, Hus too stressed the value of scripture and that scripture contained all knowledge on matters pertaining to faith. Hus himself in his *Historia et monumenta* boldly asserted that he "desires to hold, believe, and assert whatever is contained in them as long as I have breath in me".¹⁸ Anything that was claimed by the Church was rendered false because of the lack of scriptural evidence.¹⁹ Hus famously asserted to the members at the Council of Constance that he would recant his theological convictions if "they should show its falsity by Scripture".²⁰ Luther too, when asked to recant his teachings echoed similar words at the Diet of Worms in 1521. Since scripture was primarily written in Latin, vernacular worship was certainly

¹⁷ Spinka, *John Hus*, 198.

¹⁸ J. Hus, *Historia et Monumenta*, as quoted in: Spinka, *John Hus*, 189.

¹⁹ Spinka, *John Hus*, 186.

²⁰ J. Hus, 'To the Members of the University of Prague', in: M. Spinka (ed.), *The Letters of John Hus* (Manchester, 1972), 198.

advocated by Hus. Again, much the same as Luther, Hus wanted vernacular worship for the salvation of the laity and for the written Word to be in a language understood by the laity. In 1411 for instance, Hus learned that some priests forbade the reading of the Bible in the Czech language and Hus immediately remonstrated against it because they were betrayers of the truth.²¹ The Word of God needed to be accessible to the masses. Therefore, Hus called for preaching to be performed in the vernacular and his principal works on salvation, his *Expositions of Faith, the Decalogue* and the *Lord's Prayer* were written in simple, 'popular language appropriate to the instruction of technically unlearned believers'.²² Vernacular worship aimed to secure a firm understanding of the Word of God for the masses.

Hus and Luther are almost interchangeable in the sense that their theological concepts evolved through the careful study of scripture. For Luther, his understanding of scripture led him to the point of denying the integral components of Catholic doctrine. Hus too came to a similar impasse, but Hus did not completely deny the traditional ceremony, ritual and saints, to name but a few. Hus laid weight on the idea that these elements should not be taken literally. In the case of the saints and the visual arts that decorated the Church, these to Hus, always remained pictures and were simply aids to assist the laity in understanding the Bible. A picture of Christ is only a picture and should not be worshipped for it diverts attention from the true subject.²³ In his *Expositio Decalogi*, written in 1409-10, Hus outlines the reasons for imagery in the Church. Pictures

meet the ignorance of the common people who do not know how to read books; secondly, for the slowness of the mind so as to enable those who are not moved by what they hear to be moved by what they see; and thirdly, for the fickleness of the

²¹ Spinka, *John Hus*, 77.

²² *Ibid.*, 195.

²³ E. C. S. Molnar, 'The Liturgical Reforms of John Hus', *Speculum* 41 (1966), 297-303.

mind which easily forgets what was heard, whereas visually noted sculptures and pictures can be better remembered.²⁴

Hus was heavily critical of the corruption that infested the Church; it was evident at all levels of the hierarchy from local priests to bishops. Corruption within the Church can be seen as a top-down development, because senior clergymen including the popes of the time were too focused on pursuing secular goals and enhancing the Church's legal status and coercive powers. Therefore, to both Hus and Luther, the clergy neglecting their spiritual duties put the salvation of Christendom at risk. Simony, in particular, was a major focus for Hus, simony was heresy and it was prominent in all Church sectors.²⁵ Simoniacal practices to Hus covered buying or selling high clerical offices, the selling of indulgences and the Church charging for services including baptism and funerals. In a letter written to Archbishop Zbynek, Hus defends his beliefs by asserting, "in some places money is paid for the receiving of chrysm, as well as for baptism and communion. This is simoniacal heresy... Christ's gifts [that are] freely given should be freely dispensed".²⁶ Earthly pleasures are not for the priestly men for they channel attention away from the spiritual duties they are ordained to perform. Indulgences were central to papal wealth and had a very long history but the indulgence was a facet of the Church that both Hus and Luther found difficult to conform with and indulgences really sparked the growing conflict between pope and reformer. Hus did not want to see the laity, especially the poorer members being exploited, in turn being misled regarding their spiritual welfare. Hus opposed the idea of purchasing faith for the clergyman was in no position to claim he had the power to remit sins.²⁷ The crusading bull issued by Pope John XXIII in September 1411 ordered the selling of indulgences to then wage war on King Ladislaus of Naples, the protector of the rival Pope Gregory. The nature of the indulgence was secular. Hus therefore argued that war is for the temporal ruler, not

²⁴ Hus, *Expositio Decalogi*, as quoted in: Molnar, 'The Liturgical Reforms of John Hus', 297.

²⁵ Spinka, *John Hus*, 196.

²⁶ J. Hus, 'To Archbishop Zbynek in Defence against the Charges of the Clergy', in: Spinka (ed.), *The Letters of John Hus*, 25.

²⁷ Spinka, *John Hus*, 138.

for the pope. The clergy should fight only with the spiritual sword through prayer.²⁸ Hus reached these “radical” conclusions, in a similar fashion to that of Luther, from the close study of scripture and thus felt that the Church’s temporal status and prerogatives were null and void.

It seems reasonable to assert that for Hus, the theological preconditions were in place for a similar natured reformation to take shape, albeit a slightly softer one at that. In spite of that, the Reformation took place over a century later. What impeded Hus and why did Luther succeed? The leading factor that helps to answer such a question is that Luther’s immediate political and cultural atmosphere enabled him to make significant progress with spreading the evangelical word. Luther targeted the right people at the right time, he was operating in a Germany that was divided into principalities and thus divided into egos and ideologies. An area that collectively despised the hold the Papacy was able to maintain, Rome was continuing to absorb the wealth out of the territories and Luther could therefore play on these circumstances and assist the already growing German nationalism. In addition to this, Elector Frederick, one of the most powerful men at the time, made sure Luther was not unfairly trialled and was always there to ensure his protection at the most important of times. Luther, quite simply, had the luxury of administering his reforms in a relatively more modern environment than that of Hus. The urban towns and cities displayed high levels of literacy and combined with the growth of the printing press, Luther’s sermons, pamphlets, catechisms and notable writings, for instance his *Ninety-Five Theses* (1517) and *On Secular Authority* (1523), were quickly published and widely circulated reaching countries as far as England. More importantly, these works could be understood. For Luther, therefore, everything fell into place at exactly the right time.

Hus’s socio-political context made his eventual burning almost inevitable. From the view of a modern sceptic, Hus can be seen as being naïve in attempting to reform the Church within the confines of such a turbulent political backdrop but a reformer in search of spiritual truth, Hus’s religious convictions trumped all other considerations.

²⁸ Ibid., 137.

Prior to and during Hus's life, the main obstruction for Hus was that he was proposing reforms in the midst of a conciliar period, witnessing the emergence of a General Council that was aiming to put an end to the Papal Schism of 1378 and ultimately transform the papacy into a constitutional not absolute monarchy with the General Council claiming sovereignty over the pope. The famous decree *Sacrosancta*, in April 1415, outlined the aims of the conciliar movement at the Council of Constance,

to bring about the end of the present Schism and the union and reformation of the church of God in head and members ... Further it declares that any person of whatever position, rank, or dignity, even a pope, who contumaciously refuses to obey the mandates, statutes, ordinances, or regulations enacted or to be enacted by this holy synod, or by any other general council lawfully assembled ... be duly punished.²⁹

Therefore, if the Council was treating the heads of the Church with such vigour, Hus was certainly not going to be treated in any other way; he was an outright heretic in their eyes, and essentially condemned before any hearing, Hus and the Council were mutually exclusive. Hus's main heresy was his idea of the Church being limited to the predestinate and what makes this of particular interest is that this idea of predestination was never explicitly labelled as being heretical and his view was derived from Pauline and Augustinian writings.³⁰ Since the Council was adamant on achieving its objective of eliminating heresy, this prevented Hus from exercising his legitimate right to a free hearing. "They were all crying out against me like the Jews against Jesus".³¹ Hus was assumed a heretic and was never given the chance to explain his writings; the Council simply embraced the fabricated charges drawn up by his enemies.³² Moreover, the men conducting Hus's trial were firm believers in the Church being a legitimate legal institution. Again, with Hus arguing on the contrary, by claiming

²⁹ Hus, *Sacrosancta*, in: M. Spinka, *John Hus at the Council of Constance* (New York, 1965), 65.

³⁰ Spinka, *John Hus at the Council of Constance*, 73.

³¹ J. Hus, 'To His Friends Staying on in Constance', in: Hus, *Letters*, 207.

³² Spinka, *John Hus at the Council of Constance*, 74.

that through scripture the Church never had such powers, Hus and Council were bound to reach a stalemate with the Council coming out on top.

Hus was a stubborn character, unwilling to recant unless proven incorrect by scripture. Luther too followed an almost identical line of argument, but Luther was protected. Luther had been promised safe conduct to and from his various hearings by Elector Frederick, most notably to the Diet of Worms in 1521, had he not received such support Luther may have come to similar ends to that of Hus. Hus was promised safe conduct to and from the Council of Constance by king Sigismund, but the extent to which that promise was kept was modest. Sigismund wanted Hus to receive a fair trial and a safe journey, but Hus, eager to confront his enemies with confidence in his faith alone, departed to Constance before the official letter of safe conduct was written.³³ Moreover, Sigismund overseeing the Council was keen to fulfil its targets and thus ordered the Council to ensure the suppression of heresy. The politics of the situation was complex and Sigismund's actions are still debated and remain controversial regarding the extent to which he assisted Hus's downfall. However, Hus was isolated, nothing but a miracle was enough to save him and his unfortunate end was inescapable.

As is the case for the many great historical figures, being at the right place at the right time is the key to change. Luther was able to exploit his immediate socio-political context in a way Hus was unable to. That being said, however, had Hus been able to enjoy the various instruments of Luther's success, it still appears reasonable to assert that Hus had the capacity to lead his own reformation and bring about the doctrinal changes Luther later advocated. The theological fundamentals of both reformers are close to identical. Scripture was the bedrock of both Hus and Luther's religious principles. Therefore, both reformers forged their beliefs according to the Word of God. As scripture was the base of religious truth, Hus's reform movement would have evolved in a similar fashion to that of the Lutheran Reformation. The departure from Church doctrine and eventual rejection of papal authority all stemmed from the study of scripture. Hus and Luther strived to strip the faith to its bare essentials to uncover

³³ Hus, *Letters*, 146

the religious truths in the hope of safeguarding the salvation of their parishioners. With both men sharing uniform pious objectives and coming to almost homogenous conclusions, reform could have been attained over a century earlier.

Bibliography

- Atkinson, J., *The Trial of Luther* (London, 1971).
- Bainton, R. H., *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther* (New York, 1950).
- Dixon, C. S., *The Reformation in Germany* (Oxford, 2002).
- Hus, John, *The Letters of John Hus*, ed. H. B. Workman and R. M. Pope (London, 1904).
- Luther, Martin, *The Letters of Martin Luther*, ed. M.A. Currie (London, 1908).
- McNally, R. E., 'The Ninety-Five Theses of Martin Luther', *Theological Studies* 28 (1967), 439-480.
- Michelet, M. *The Life of Martin Luther* (London, 1846).
- Molnar, E. C. S., 'The Liturgical Reforms of John Hus', *Speculum* 41 (1966), 297-303.
- Spinka, M., *John Hus: A Biography* (Princeton, 1968).
- Spinka, M., *John Hus at the Council of Constance* (New York, 1965).
- Spinka, M (ed.), *The Letters of John Hus* (Manchester, 1972).

Female Agency and the ANZAC Legend: Grief and Commemoration in Australia during the Inter-war Years

Imogen Crarer

University of Exeter

This article aims to readdress the way female agency is considered through analysis of Australia's ANZAC legend in Australia in the inter-war years. It argues that the feminist position has been useful in exposing social inequality, but that it is now more beneficial to focus on what women did do in order to better understand societies in general and post First World War Australia in particular. This article uses Australian war memorial sculpture, commemorative activity and the Australian Women's Weekly to prove the presence of female agency in the "masculine" realm of the ANZAC legend, and to demonstrate that women were a significant force in establishing the ANZAC legend in Australian memory and society.

Female agency is fundamentally associated with Australia's ANZAC legend. This statement is somewhat unusual as some Australian historiography criticises the ANZAC legend as exclusive and misleading as it embodies Australia's war experience solely through the white male soldier.¹ Nevertheless, through analysis of Australian war memorial sculpture, women's role in ANZAC commemoration, and the ANZAC Day issues of *The Australian Women's Weekly* from 1934 to 1939, this article shall argue that women were not passive accessories in the establishment of the ANZAC legend. Rather, women actively promulgated it and thus the ANZAC legend is a site of female agency.

¹ M. Lake, 'Introduction: What Have You Done For Your Country', in: Marilyn Lake, Henry Reynolds, Mark McKenna, and Joy Damousi (eds.), *What's Wrong with ANZAC? The Militarization of Australian History* (Sydney, 2010), 20.

Firstly the ANZAC legend requires some explanation. Charles Bean is considered the architect of the ANZAC legend.² In his war-time journalistic work and his post-war activity as the official military historian of the Great War, Bean crafted what became known as the ANZAC legend: he conceptualised and then presented ANZAC soldiers as epitomising a uniquely Australian national character in their heroism, courage, egalitarianism and mate-ship. The origin of these definitive characteristics was believed to be the iconic Bushman of the tough settler frontier environment whose romantic image held the imagination of Australian society.³ Bean was incredibly influential as the official Australian war correspondent in shaping Australian perceptions of the war and its combatants, with his reports appearing in newspapers throughout Australia.⁴ Landing with the ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) during their assault on the Gallipoli peninsula, Bean lived and worked with the ANZAC soldiers throughout the war.⁵ This personal experience and insight into the individual stories of ANZAC soldiers deeply impressed Bean and imbued him with a conscious responsibility to record the experience of Australian soldiers in their own right rather than as merely part of the British Imperial forces.⁶

A strong rhetoric of heroism was cultivated around the ANZACs and Bean was its primary orchestrator. Heroic rhetoric concerning the military in general and First World War soldiers in particular is not unique to Australia. However the ANZAC legend, with its worship-like celebration of the ANZAC soldiers, has a special significance for the Australian public mind because of its inherent link to the formation of Australia's sense of nationhood.⁷ Bean's expounding of the particular set of

² A. Thompson, *ANZAC Memories. Living with the legend* (Melbourne, 1994), 46.

³ Ibid., 62-64; see entirety of D. Kent, 'Bean's ANZAC and the Making of the ANZAC Legend', in: Anna Rutherford and James Wieland (eds.) *War: Australia's Creative Response* (Sydney, 1997).

⁴ Thompson, *ANZAC Memories*, 46; Kent, 'Bean's ANZAC', 36.

⁵ Thompson, *ANZAC Memories*, 62-64;

⁶ K. Fewster, 'Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and the Making of the ANZAC Legend', *Journal of Australian Studies* 10 (1982), 20.

⁷ Lake, 'Introduction', 2-4, 17.

characteristics shown by the men of the A.I.F (Australian Imperial Force) revealed to the fledgling country of Australia, its own national character. The colonies had only become a unified whole through Federation in 1901 and this national sense of self was still lacking by the outbreak of the First World War. It is important to note that this sense of a nation was still compatible with membership of the British Empire at this time. The idea that war was important to nationhood was an important contemporary manifestation, born out of an environment where Darwin's survival of the fittest was the predominant scientific discourse and was being used in a cultural context to explain human society.⁸ Bean, with his British upbringing, existed in this context.⁹ He and others viewed the war as federated Australia's first test in the international arena and believed that this militaristic endeavour would cement Australia as a nation both at home and abroad. He believed that the ANZACS carried Australia through this test by impressing with their soldierly prowess. They were thus hailed by Bean and others as exemplary representations of "the Australian", thus establishing a sense of Australian identity within the minds of those at home, in London, and in the rest of the British Empire and the world. The ANZAC Legend has therefore been a powerful force in the Australian public consciousness and, despite challenges to it, remains so today.¹⁰

With this foundation information now in place, this article shall turn to the main task in hand – that of proving the ANZAC Legend to be a site of female agency in face of assertions to the contrary. The ANZAC legend has undergone scrutiny by Australian historians since the 1960s, with it and its commemoration being dubbed a 'celebration of Australian masculinity' by Adrian Howe in 1983.¹¹ In this vein feminist historians like Carmel Shute have thus condemned the ANZAC legend, arguing that it reinforces

⁸ M. L. Wade, 'From Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century Racial Science: Continuity and Change' in B. Lang (ed.) *Race and Racism in Theory and Practice* (New York and Oxford, 2000), 34-37.

⁹ Thompson, *ANZAC Memories*, 48-49.

¹⁰ H. Reynolds and M. Lake, 'Epilogue: Moving On', in: M. Lake and H. Reynolds (eds.) *What's Wrong with ANZAC: The Militarisation of Australian History* (Sydney, 2010), 157.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

traditional gender stereotypes and removes female power.¹² This argument is largely valid; the ANZAC legend's primary subject is male soldiers, its primary orchestrators were men, and gender stereotyping of passive women to form a comparison to courageous 'history making men' is inherent in the ANZAC legend.¹³ On this basis, the ANZAC legend seems a site devoid of female agency.

However, while rightfully condemning the absence of obvious female power within the legend, Shute et al. actually continue female disempowerment by ignoring the more subtle role women played in shaping Australian cultural memory through their relationship with ANZAC. Forms of agency are often obscured by the 'big' narratives; the feminist position has been invaluable in revolutionising historical practice and exposing the shortcomings of dominant idea, but as the historiographical focus around the ANZAC legend has largely been to prove the inequality of society through analysis of what women could not do in public memory rather than what they did do, female agency of any kind has been overlooked. This approach has now outlived its utility – a more nuanced attitude which explores female agency on its own terms rather than in comparison with male agency facilitates a richer understanding of complex social ideas like the ANZAC legend. The comments of the political and gender theorist Robin LeBlanc relating to the politics of the Japanese housewife resonate strongly here. She argues that:

We use our theories to construct broad characterizations about the processes of individual political behaviour. We spend relatively little time checking the dimensions in which our "indicators" and our "categories" fail to fit the people we want to study.

Australian women in the inter-war years cannot be definitively categorised as merely passive accessories to the establishment of the ANZAC legend, such positioned due to their second-rate status in a patriarchal society. Female agency was in fact fundamental in establishing the ANZAC legend within the Australian social mind. Individual women

¹² C. Shute, 'Heroines and heroes: sexual mythology in Australia 1914-1918', *Hecate* 1 (1975), 18-19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 19.

actively engaged with, supported and promulgated the ANZAC legend. This is most clearly demonstrated in ANZAC commemoration. Women's grief and pride was expressed within commemoration, physically through memorial sculpture and dynamically through commemorative activity. Commemoration established the ANZAC legend in the Australian public consciousness, thus women had an important role in shaping national memory.¹⁴ Female agency is also evident in Australian women's use of the ANZAC legend and its rhetoric to indicate their grief, pride and sacrifice as "the ones left behind". Furthermore, evidence of female agency lies in women using the ANZAC legend to express their support for peace in the run-up to the Second World War.

The role of the female in ANZAC war memorial sculpture demonstrates that women were involved in the propagation of the ANZAC legend as passive artistic representations, but also as active emotional investors. Richard Grassby argues that the physical environment is often ignored by cultural historians; to truly comprehend the ANZAC legend, its material manifestation in commemorative sculpture must be examined.¹⁵ This is because ANZAC war memorials proliferate throughout Australia from simple plinths in a tiny rural communities, to obelisks on suburb corners, to the huge and imposing Australian War Memorial in the capital city of Canberra. These memorials hold a special significance given Australia's particular experience. Australia's geographical distance from the main theatres of war means that, unlike Europe, Australia does not bear scars of the First World War in its landscape. Also, most soldiers' bodies were not returned to Australia meaning that, out of necessity, memorials to some extent replaced graves in the public mind. The ANZAC memorials provide Australian society with material evidence for the existence of the war and the soldiers who died fighting in it. The memorials were thus a visual platform to express

¹⁴ Anita Kasabova argues for the centrality of commemoration in shaping national sense of the past in A. Kasabova, 'Memory, Memorials and Commemoration', *History and Theory* 47 (2008), 340.

¹⁵ R. Grassby, 'Material Culture and Cultural History', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 35 (2005), 591; K. Inglis, 'Men, Women and War Memorials: ANZAC Australia', in: Ken Inglis, Jay Murray and John Lack (eds.) *ANZAC Remembered: Selected Writings by K. S. Inglis* (Melbourne, 1998), 61-62.

the strengthening idea of the ANZAC legend, which was growing out of the work of Bean and others. The concept of the heroic ANZAC was literally set in stone for society. War memorials were vital to the establishment of the ANZAC legend within the Australian social fabric and therefore the connection of women to ANZAC commemorative sculpture necessitates the presence of female power in this inauguration process.

Although not found on all memorials, sculpture of the female form was used to materially commemorate ANZAC soldiers.¹⁶ Firstly, the female presence on the memorials and the close proximity of these female figures to the recorded names of the ANZAC soldiers visually and physically demonstrates the female support for ANZAC remembrance. Secondly, female sculpture helps define ANZAC soldiers as heroic, noble and self-sacrificial – the core characteristics of the ANZAC legend developed by Bean. The best example of this is the ANZAC memorial in Wellington, New South Wales, and its three bronze female figures of ‘Winged Victory holding her hero’s sword, History recording his deeds, and Fame holding a laurel wreath.’¹⁷ In the case of Gatton, Queensland, the memorial sculpture enshrines a mother’s grief; the grieving female form provides the contrast against which the strong, heroic male soldier is constructed.¹⁸ Jules Prown argues that material culture reflects the beliefs of the society which created it, therefore one can assert that femininity was considered a vital tool in helping to construct the idea of masculinity.¹⁹ Yet, to merely see these female commemorative figures as a patriarchal society’s exploitation of the female form is to deny female agency by ignoring women’s identification with these figures and support of memorials.²⁰ The women visiting these memorials to mourn and celebrate their loved

¹⁶ Inglis, ‘Men, Women and War Memorials’, 63.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 67; see Appendix I.

¹⁸ See Appendix II.

¹⁹ J. Prown, ‘The truth of material culture: history or fiction?’ in Steven Lubar and David Kingery (eds.), *History from Things: Essays on Material Culture* (Washington and London, 1993), 1.

²⁰ Craig Melrose outlines women’s commitment to memorials in: C. Melrose, ‘Triumphalism and Sacrificialism: Tradition in the Public Memory of the First World War in Australia, 1919-39’ [online], in Martin Crotty (ed.) *When the Soldiers Return: November 2007 Conference Proceedings* (Brisbane, 2009), 242-243, (accessed: 20/09/2015).

ones saw themselves in the stone female figures in their shared feminine form, their shared activity and shared emotion. ANZAC commemorative sculpture is more than just a site of passive female influence. Women actively built a connection with these memorials, understood the 'triumphalist' concept central to the ANZAC legend of the heroic and victorious ANZAC dead, and gave life and social longevity to this concept by accepting it and supporting it by their continued patronage of the memorials.²¹ Thus, female agency in the form of active female emotion and patronage, and passive female support through the material medium, existed in and around the Australian war memorials, thereby significantly contributing to the propagation of the ANZAC legend.

Women's active involvement in commemoration in the inter-war years demonstrates their role in endorsing and entrenching the ANZAC legend. ANZAC commemoration combined grief with a celebration of heroism, courage and sacrifice. Women's organisations who supported the ANZACs during the war continued to support them in memory. The Brisbane's Women's Club, for example, erected their own ANZAC memorial in 1932 – The Queensland Women's War Memorial.²² The female contingent of society did not passively rest upon their grief; the majority of women were active in helping Australian post-war society come to terms with the trauma brought by the war by using their grief as motivation for activity. Female efforts in raising funds for community memorials reflected what Joan Beaumont calls the 'enormous industry of patriotic workers' and "great sock knitting" attitude of the war years.²³ Some women even laid the memorial foundation stones. Ken Inglis picks out the example of Granny Riach from Thirroul, who tirelessly collected contributions for the community memorial and marched to the memorial with the veterans to unveil it in

²¹ For a detailed account of 'Triumphalism' – 'the public memory of victory and military supremacy' and its significance in memorials - see Melrose, 'Triumphalism and Sacrificialism', particularly p.236.

²² See appendix III; 'Biography: Brisbane Women's Club (1908-)', *Trove*, National Library of Australia, 2011, <http://nla.gov.au/nla.party-1477384>, (last accessed: 20/09/2015); for summary of women's activity see P. Adam-Smith, *Australian Women at War* (Melbourne, 1984), 75-80.

²³ Beaumont, 'Australians and the great war', 51; Adam-Smith, *Australian Women at War*, 46-48.

1920.²⁴ Inglis persuasively argues that in such female activity, the 'dominant theme [was] ...celebration of the soldier'.²⁵ Women were actively involved in enshrining their grief and pride in their soldier-heroes into the material landscape, demonstrating their belief in and commitment to the ANZAC legend and ensuring its establishment in the public consciousness.

The huge presence of women at commemorative events shows the extent of female support for the ANZAC legend and their importance in enshrining it in national heritage. The Armistice Day and ANZAC Day celebrations from 1918 into the 1920s witnessed significant female influence in terms of organisation and active participation.²⁶ The Centre for Soldiers' Wives and Mothers on the 1920 Armistice Day organised 'the route of the procession' with the march itself 'crowded...particularly with widows and bereaved mothers'.²⁷ The distinct female presence shows that women were actively supporting and sharing the ideas of ANZAC heroism, courage and sacrifice, which were and are so central to the ANZAC legend.

Women's commitment to the ANZAC legend remained strong despite a decline in active female participation in commemoration from the late 1920s. Joy Damousi has explored this decline in female involvement. She argues that women, particularly mothers, became 'marginalised in public commemoration' and became mere onlookers from the late 1920s onwards; 'women's role was to honour the sacrifice of others rather than to assert their own sacrifices'.²⁸ She considers this a removal of female agency. Damousi makes a valid point in that women were increasingly removed from active participation and the commemorative proceedings became dominated by men. The women's newspaper, *The Australian Women's Weekly*, issue of 28th April 1934 stated that

²⁴ Inglis, 'Men, Women and War Memorials', 60.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 59.

²⁶J. Damousi, 'Private Loss, Public Mourning: Motherhood, Memory and Grief in Australia during the Inter-war Years', *Women's History Review* 8 (1999), 365.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 370.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 366, 371.

'ANZAC celebrations are a tribute to the organising power of men'.²⁹ This limiting of female active involvement in commemoration was not a unique occurrence, it came about as part of the wider shift away from female agency resulting from the war's end and subsequent return of men to Australian society. Damousi is correct to express her dissatisfaction concerning the diminution of female activity in the public sphere in general and in commemoration in particular, yet she overestimates the desire of women to assert 'their own sacrifices' and paints a misleading picture by focusing only on one manifestation of female agency.³⁰

Female agency remained powerful in promulgating the ANZAC legend as even though their official capacity had changed, their motivations and support in other ways had not. Remembering and celebrating the ANZAC heroes was the fundamental purpose of women's commemorative action, not publicising their own sacrifice. Dismay arose, because women's ability to fulfil this purpose was reduced in increasingly male dominated public commemoration. This dismay sometimes manifested itself in protest; a group of women 'intruded' on the Dawn Service veterans' commemorative march in Melbourne in 1938 rather than merely supporting from the side-lines.³¹ Damousi reads this as women wishing to assert their grief and sacrifices in their own right.³² However, this argument neglects the context of the ANZAC legend which women used to conceptualise their grief and sacrifice. Women viewed their experiences within the wider war experience which had ANZAC soldiers at its core. They derived comfort and pride from collective fashioning of their men (who left them willingly or unwillingly) as courageous, egalitarian heroes and demonstrated this publically. Women thus continued to be committed to ANZAC commemoration even though their particular struggles as lovers and mothers were no longer officially recognised. The *A.W.W* lauded 'the great

²⁹ 'WOMEN'S PART in ANZAC Celebrations', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 28th April 1934. Available from *Trove* (last accessed: 20/09/2015), 2.

³⁰ Damousi, 'Private Loss, Public Mourning', 365.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 372.

³² *Ibid.*, 372-373.

army of women who help to keep alive the spirit of ANZAC'.³³ It celebrated the activities of women's groups who no longer enjoyed a part in official ceremonial organisation but remained active in unofficial capacities such as fundraising, decoration, hospitality and distribution of gifts and/or commemorative items.³⁴

The list of societies which directly or indirectly contribute to the great festival of ANZAC, and give practical effect to its teaching, is endless.³⁵

It is possible that the *A.W.W* overemphasised the female contribution given their focus on women's activity and interests of all kinds. Yet, the factual accuracy of statements such as the one above is less important than the feeling they evidence. Australian women considered themselves to be an active and significant force in the support and propagation of the ANZAC legend. They considered ANZAC commemoration to be a site of female agency even if it was not discussed using that term. Thus, women remained significant in promoting the ANZAC legend even when they were relegated to onlookers and unofficial contributors.

The ANZAC legend provides the chosen rhetoric used to express women's feelings and concerns thus demonstrating women's agency. While idealistic rhetoric was dominant during the inter-war years, to merely discount women's use of it as a symptom of social patriarchy is to ignore female choice even in its more limited form.³⁶ Women provided an unofficial mouth piece for promulgating the ANZAC legend. The inter-war issues of the *A.W.W* evidence female feeling as the *A.W.W* was incredibly popular within female society. It was Australia's first women's own publication beginning in 1933 and remained the dominant women's publication even after competition emerged.³⁷ It

³³ 'WOMEN'S PART in ANZAC Celebrations', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 28th April 1934, 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁶ Melrose argues that triumphalist and heroic rhetoric was prevalent after the war in: Melrose, 'Triumphalism and Sacrificialism', 238.

³⁷ 'Biography: The Australian Women's Weekly (1933-)', *Trove*, National Library of Australia, 2009, <http://nla.gov.au/nla.party-634568>, (accessed: 20/09/2015) .

had a female editor (Alice Jackson) from 1934 onwards and attracted most Australian women.³⁸ Despite the exclusion of Australia's poorest women from its readership, the *A.W.W's* impressive circulation implies that its sentiments enjoyed popular appeal.³⁹ Its content demonstrates that women understood and used the ANZAC legend rhetoric of heroism and pride when discussing commemoration and that its sentiments resounded with them. Its presence on the front and second pages of the 1934 ANZAC Day issue demonstrates this clearly:

FOR THE VALIANT DEAD
OUR ANTHEMS SUNG.
THEIRS ARE THE SPIRITS LIVING ON
DEATHLESS IN PRIDE.⁴⁰

Women are...teaching [the rising generation] of the heritage that has come to them from the Men of ANZAC.⁴¹

Women not only supported the ANZAC legend, but saw themselves as a primary way of promulgating it in Australian society and cementing it as public memory. ANZAC legend rhetoric in the *A.W.W* ANZAC commemorative issues of 1934-1936 expressing pride in the 'heroes of Gallipoli' was juxtaposed with expressions of female grief, sacrifice and stoicism.⁴² The link between women and soldiers reflected some of the glory of the ANZAC legend back onto women; women felt part of the ANZAC legend even if not its direct focus and used it to express their pride and grief for their 'own

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ For understanding the relationship between audience and content in newspapers, see: S. Vella, 'Newspapers', in: Miriam Dobson, Benjamin Ziemann (eds.), *Reading Primary Sources: the Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century History* (London, 2009), 192-194.

⁴⁰ 'Tribute', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 28th April 1934, front-page.

⁴¹ 'WOMEN'S PART in ANZAC Celebrations', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 28th April 1934, 2.

⁴² 'ANZAC DAY is Peace Day!', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 27th April 1935, Available from Trove, (accessed: 20/09/2015), 4; see: *The Australian Women's Weekly*, issues: 28th April 1934, 27th April 1935, and 25th April 1936. Available from Trove, (accessed: 20/09/2015),

particular heroes', 'the valiant dead' in general, and for themselves.⁴³ This demonstrates that women felt a level of ownership and control over the ANZAC legend along with men in the inter-war years.

This female ownership of the ANZAC legend is also demonstrated its appropriation to promote peace in the build up to World War Two. The *A.W.W* 1939 ANZAC Day issue had a political element; the editorial entitled 'The Lesson of ANZAC' used the ANZAC legend and its rhetoric to persuade readers to maintain a 'love of peace'.⁴⁴

Succeeding generations should lay the palm of perpetual peace with the laurel wreath of ANZAC. ⁴⁵

Such statements demonstrate that Editor Alice Jackson recognised the ANZAC legend as a powerful force among her female readership which she could appeal to. She was not alone in this, early Australian feminist and peace promoter Jessie Street 'combined a love of peace with an attachment to ANZAC symbolism'.⁴⁶ The ANZAC legend provided a basis for many individuals in their reactions to war; some pushed for peace and some supported war, but most recognised the heroism and courage of the Diggers and used that to support their views. Some women, like Alice Jackson, used it to argue that noble ANZAC sacrifices for peace should not be in vain. Women utilising the ANZAC legend in support of peace shows that they actively engaged with it and did not consider it an exclusive male domain.

⁴³ 'ANZAC DAY is Peace Day!', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 27th April 1935, p.4; 'Tribute', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 28th April 1934, front-page.

⁴⁴ 'An Editorial, THE LESSON OF ANZAC', *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 29th April 1939, Available from *Trove* (last accessed: 20/09/2015), 14.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁶ Inglis, 'Men, Women and War Memorials', 69; H. Radi, 'Street, Jessie Mary (1889-1970)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, (Canberra, 2002), accessed online at: <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/street-jessie-mary-11789>, (accessed: 20/09/2015).

In conclusion, the ANZAC legend is in fact a site of female agency. Women were significant in the legend's establishment in Australian memory and public consciousness as active subscribers and promulgators of it. Women helped construct the understanding of ANZAC soldiers as heroic, noble, self-sacrificial and glorious by understanding the ANZACs in those terms themselves and reflecting it in their activities relating to public commemoration. Even though female contributions to ANZAC commemoration became increasingly unofficial in the sense that they weren't included in the official proceedings, female contributions in the forms of fund-raising, spectating and hospitality remained important in making ANZAC commemoration successful and a part of the Australian social fabric. Women still considered themselves as involved with the ANZAC legend; they still envisaged the legend as being "for them as well" in displaying their commitment to Australia's dead and Australia as a nation. This sense of female possession of the ANZAC legend and its use to show this commitment is evident in women's employment of it to support peace in case of possible repeated war. This unequivocally demonstrates female agency. Women were also important in the material reflection of the ANZAC legend through memorial sculpture; they raised money, erected their own memorials, laid founding stones and featured on the memorials in sculptural form. Therefore, women were important in the imprinting of the ANZAC legend physically and emotionally upon Australian social memory of the Great War. The ANZAC legend was not something which was merely supported and believed in by women, it was also used by women to reflect their own stoicism and sacrifice. Its use shows that women understood themselves as having a part in the legend although their focus remained the celebration and mourning of the male ANZAC heroes.

This evidence has proven that, although the content of the ANZAC legend is exclusive due to its masculine core, the activity surrounding it in Australia in the inter-war years shows its social dynamics to be much more complex. Contrary to initial impressions, the ANZAC legend is an area of female agency with women playing a significant role in its establishment in Australian memory.

Bibliography

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

- ANZAC Cenotaph, Wellington, New South Wales.
- ANZAC Memorial, Gatton, Queensland.
- The Queensland Women's War Memorial in ANZAC Square, Brisbane.
- *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 28th April 1934, Available from *Trove* (accessed: 20/09/2015).
- *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 27th April 1935, Available from *Trove* (accessed: 20/09/2015).
- *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 25th April 1936, Available from *Trove* (accessed: 20/09/2015).
- *The Australian Women's Weekly*, 29th April 1939, Available from *Trove* (accessed: 20/09/2015).

2. SECONDARY SOURCES:

(a) Books

- Adam-Smith, Patsy, *Australian Women at War* (Melbourne, 1984).
- Inglis, Ken, 'Men, Women and War Memorials: ANZAC Australia', in: Ken Inglis,, Murray, Jay, Lack, John (eds.) *ANZAC Remembered: Selected Writings by K. S. Inglis* (Melbourne, 1998), 40-60.
- Kent, David, 'Bean's ANZAC and the Making of the ANZAC Legend', in: Rutherford, Anna, Wieland, James (eds.) *War: Australia's Creative Response* (Sydney, 1997), 27-41.
- Lake, Marilyn, 'Introduction: What Have You Done for your Country', in Lake, Marilyn, Reynolds, Henry, McKenna, Mark, Damousi, Joy (eds.) *What's Wrong with ANZAC? The Militarization of Australian History* (Sydney, 2010), 1-24.
- Prown, Jules, 'The Truth of Material Culture: History or Fiction?' in: Lubar, Steven, Kingery, David (eds.), *History from Things: Essays on Material Culture* (Washington and London, 1993), 1-20.

- Reynolds, H., Lake, M., 'Epilogue: moving on', in: Lake, Marilyn, Reynolds, Henry (eds.) *What's Wrong with ANZAC: The Militarisation of Australian History* (Sydney, 2010), 157-167.
- Thompson, Alistair, *ANZAC Memories. Living with the legend*, Melbourne (Oxford, 1994).
- Vella, Stephen, 'Newspapers', in: Dobson, Miriam, Ziemann, Benjamin (eds.) *Reading Primary Sources: the Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-century History* (London, 2009), 192-209.
- Wade, M., L., 'From Eighteenth to Nineteenth Century Racial Science: Continuity and Change' in: B. Lang (ed.) *Race and Racism in Theory and Practice* (New York and Oxford, 2000), 27-45.

(b) Journals

- Beaumont, Joan, 'Australians and the Great War: Battle, the Home Front and Memory', *Agora* 49 (2014), 46-54.
- Damousi, Joy, 'Private Loss, Public Mourning: Motherhood, Memory and Grief in Australia during the Inter-war Years', *Women's History Review* 18 (1999), 365-378.
- Fewster, K., 'Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett and the Making of the ANZAC Legend', *Journal of Australian Studies* 10 (1982), 17-30.
- Grassby, Richard, 'Material Culture and Cultural History', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 25 (2005), 591-603.
- Howe, Adrian, 'ANZAC mythology and the feminist challenge', *Melbourne Journal of Politics* 15 (1983), 16-23.
- Kasabova, Anita, 'Memory, Memorials and Commemoration', *History and Theory* 47 (2008), 331-350.
- Shute, Carmel, 'Heroines and Heroes: Sexual Mythology in Australia 1914-1918', *Hecate* 1 (1975), 2-22.

(c) Web Resources

- 'Biography: Brisbane Women's Club (1908-)', *Trove*, National Library of Australia, 2011, <http://nla.gov.au/nla.party-1477384>, (accessed: 20/09/2015).
- 'Biography: The Australian Women's Weekly (1933-)', *Trove*, National Library of Australia, 2009, <http://nla.gov.au/nla.party-634568>, (accessed: 20/09/2015).
- Melrose, Craig, 'Triumphalism and Sacrificialism: Tradition in the Public Memory of the First World War in Australia, 1919-39' [online], in: Crotty, Martin (ed.) *When the Soldiers Return: November 2007 Conference Proceedings* (Brisbane, 2009), (accessed: 20/09/2015).
- Radi, Heather, 'Street, Jessie Mary (1889-1970)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Canberra, Australian National University, 2002, accessed online <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/street-jessie-mary-11789>, (accessed: 20/09/2015).

Appendix I: ANZAC Cenotaph, Wellington, New South Wales

Source: <http://monumentaaustralia.org.au/themes/conflict/multiple/display/23737-wellington-cenotaph/>, (accessed: 20/09/2015).



Note the three female figures in bronze; Winged Victory (centre), History (right) and Fame (left).

Appendix II: ANZAC Memorial, Gatton, Queensland

Source: <http://www.qldwarmemorials.com.au/traditions/symbolism/> (last accessed: 20/09/2015)



The sculpture on this memorial is known as the 'Grieving Mother'.

Appendix III: The Queensland Women's War Memorial in ANZAC Square, Brisbane

Source: <http://www.qldwarmemorials.com.au/memorial/?id=88>, (accessed: 20/09/2015).



The Political and Economic Response of the Jewish communities of Glasgow and Manchester to the Nazi Regime in 1933-1939

Susannah Fitzgerald

University of Glasgow

The rise of Nazism and the events of the Holocaust are imprinted on the collective memory of Europe. It was a moment that embodied the depravity of humankind, the epitome of our flaws. Yet in the midst of this nadir, there were those who countered with compassion. We are concerned with these people. To elucidate their stories and their motivations is to find hope in the dark, and to find lessons for our own times. However, too often history focuses on grandiose acts, where the daily dredge of the common but committed citizen is overlooked. In an effort to reverse this trend, this essay will examine how the Jewish communities of Glasgow and Manchester responded to the Nazi regime in the years before the outbreak of war, challenging the atrocities which it committed and preached.

As peripheral communities, Glasgow and Manchester Jewry's responses to the Nazi regime often focused on economic and political action. The importance of the boycott of German goods and services, fundraising for refugee relief and reconstruction, and protests against the Nazi regime's excesses were each crucial local responses to an international problem. An analysis of these responses will demonstrate that, though fundraising was universally accepted, the questions of boycott and protest were far more contested. Local factors were key in determining the nuances of each communities approach, highlighting the complexity of British Jewish responses out with the dominant London community.

1. British Jewry in the 1930s

To understand the responses of Glasgow and Manchester Jews to the Nazi regime, it is essential to contextualise these communities within British Jewish society. The 1930s was a time of contestation and change for Britain's Jews, which provides important context to the debates and divisions which surrounded responses to the Nazi regime.¹ Until the late nineteenth century, the British Jewish community was fairly small and was mostly composed of Sephardic Jews and traders from Central Europe.² It had become a prosperous community and was dominated by a group of powerful and interconnected families which has been dubbed the 'Cousinhood' by Chaim Bermant.³ Since 1760, the community has been led by the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BoD). This 'Parliament of the Jews' was controlled by the 'Cousinhood' and they exported their highly anglicised, middle class values to the rest of British Jewry.⁴ Since emancipation, the Jewish elite had placed British values over Jewish ones, believing that acceptance was conditional on integration.⁵

However, the dynamics of Jewish life in Britain changed dramatically, and permanently, when an era of mass migration began in the late nineteenth century.⁶ Pogroms, poverty, and persecution in Eastern Europe caused Jews to flee, with many finding themselves in Britain.⁷ However, there were distinct cultural and religious differences between the Eastern European Jews and the anglicised Jewish community. On the whole, Eastern European Jews were far more religiously observant, far more

¹ V.D. Lipman, *A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858* (Leicester, 1990), 173-4.

² Todd Endelman, *The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000* (Berkeley, 2002), 79.

³ Chaim Bermant, *Troubled Eden: An Anatomy of British Jewry* (London, 1969), 62.

⁴ Raphael Langham, *250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010* (Edgware, 2010), 2.

⁵ Gideon Shimoni, 'The Non-Zionists in Anglo-Jewry, 1937-48', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* 28 (1986), 108; Bill Williams, 'East and West': Class and Community in Manchester Jewry, 1850-1914', in: David Cesarini (ed.), *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry* (Oxford, 1990), 20.

⁶ Endelman, *Jews*, 127.

⁷ Geoffrey Alderman, *Modern British Jewry* (Oxford, 1992), 102.

insular, and far more resolute in their Jewishness.⁸ Assimilation had been neither possible nor desired in the *shtetls* of their homelands.

The Jewish elite strove to instil British values in the new immigrants and limit Yiddish culture.⁹ Much of this behaviour was driven by concern to maintain a respectable communal image and fears of anti-Semitism.¹⁰ The elite tended towards the view that anti-Semitism was, at least partially, caused by overtly Jewish behaviour.¹¹ In their view, assimilation was therefore vital not only for the respectability of Britain's Jewish community, but also its safety.

Glasgow's Jewish community was very much comprised of Eastern European immigrants.¹² The first record of Jews in Glasgow dates back to 1812, though the development of a community was slow; it numbered no more than 1,000 in 1879.¹³ By the turn of the century this number had leaped to 5,000 and it had further grown to around 15,000 by the 1930s.¹⁴ Many Jews were attracted by the opportunities Glasgow provided as a booming industrial city, whilst others settled there unintentionally, unable to afford the fare to the US.¹⁵ The Glasgow community, the fourth largest in Britain in the 1930s, was thus largely a product of the wave of Eastern European immigration.¹⁶

In socio-economic terms, the Glasgow Jewish community was as distant from the London Jewish elite as it was culturally. Whilst the London elite were well-established and generally prosperous, the Glasgow Jewish community were largely

⁸ Endelman, *Jews*, 127.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹⁰ Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees, and the Holocaust, 1933-1948* (Oxford, 2000), 16.

¹¹ Lipman, *History*, 188.

¹² Kenneth E. Collins, *Second City Jewry: The Jews of Glasgow in the Age of Expansion, 1790-1919* (Glasgow, 1990), 8.

¹³ Abraham Levy, *The Origins of Scottish Jewry* (Glasgow, 1959), 19, 27.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁵ Collins, *Second*, 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

destitute and poorly integrated.¹⁷ In 1936, over 50% of Glasgow Jews lived in the impoverished Gorbals area.¹⁸ Given this, it is often easier to draw parallels between Glasgow Jewry and the Jews of London's East End; most East End Jews were immigrants or the children of immigrants.¹⁹ These demographic similarities often led to political similarities, such as enthusiasm for Zionism or socialism.²⁰ Glasgow had wealthier Jews too, however, they were also from an Eastern European background.²¹ Therefore, Glasgow's Jewish community was not pressured to assimilate in the same way other communities were.

Whilst Glasgow may have been the second city of the empire, Manchester was the second city of British Jewry. In the 1930s, its population was around 40,000, making it the largest community outside London.²² The Manchester Jewish community began in the eighteenth century and grew steadily over the nineteenth century so that, by 1871, it totalled 3,800.²³ This meant that there was already a fairly well established Jewish community in Manchester by the time of mass immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, this established Manchester Jewish community was far more assimilated than their equivalent population in Glasgow.²⁴ In this respect, they had more in common with the London Jewish elite.

The assimilated nature of Manchester's Jewish community meant that they vigorously strove to engender the same attitude amongst new Eastern European arrivals. Notable efforts were made to delimit the use of Yiddish and transform religious

¹⁷ Rayner Kölmel, 'German-Jewish Refugees in Scotland', in: Kenneth E. Collins (ed.), *Aspects of Scottish Jewry* (Glasgow, 1987), 60.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁹ Alderman, *Modern*, 118.

²⁰ Endelman, *Jews*, 127.

²¹ Kenneth E. Collins, 'The Growth and Development of Scottish Jewry, 1880-1940', in: Kenneth E. Collins (ed.), *Aspects of Scottish Jewry* (Glasgow, 1987), 5.

²² Williams, Bill, *Jews and Other Foreigners: Manchester and the Rescue of Victims of European Fascism, 1933-1940* (Manchester, 2011), 11.

²³ Monty Dobkin, *More Tales of Manchester Jewry* (Manchester, 1994), 8.

²⁴ Bill Williams, *Manchester Jewry: A Pictorial History, 1788-1988* (Manchester, 1988), 5.

practices into a more anglicised and Hebraic form of Judaism.²⁵ Efforts were also made to transmit middle class values.²⁶ Communal activity was far more centralised in Manchester, with less debate and contention than Glasgow.²⁷ Furthermore, even if many Manchester Jews were poor, they were more concerned with the politics of aspiration than the politics of class struggle.²⁸ Therefore, though Glasgow and Manchester underwent a similar demographic process, the social and political results were not necessary consistent. This would have significance for how each community responded to the Nazi's rise to power, especially surrounding the controversial question of boycott.

2. Boycott

Calls for boycott were the first real action taken against the Nazi regime by British Jews, following the example set by Polish Jews and followed by other communities.²⁹ However, the BoD was resolutely opposed to turning these grassroots demands into official policy. When speaking to a Glasgow audience in September 1933, Neville Laski, the President of the BoD, outlined his reasoning for this position.³⁰ Firstly, he noted that German Jews had begged him not to make the boycott official for fears of repercussions, and that such action would only lend credence to Nazi propaganda of the 'international Jew.'³¹ Above all else, he emphasised that the interests of Britain must

²⁵ Rosalyn Livshin, 'The Acculturation of the Children of Immigrant Jews in Manchester, 1890-1930', in: David Cesarani (ed.), *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry*, Ed. by David Cesarani (Oxford, 1990), 82, 85.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.85.

²⁷ Williams, 'East', 32.

²⁸ Sharon Gewirtz, 'Anti-Fascist Activity in Manchester's Jewish Community in the 1930s', *Manchester Region History Review* 4 (1990), 19.

²⁹ Sharon Gewirtz, 'Anglo-Jewish Responses to Nazi Germany 1933-1939: The Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Board of Deputies of British Jews', *Journal of Contemporary History* 26 (1991), 258.

³⁰ Jewish Echo (JE), 20 September 1933.

³¹ *Ibid.*; Manchester Central Library (MCL), Neville Laski Papers (NLP), Copy of Telegram sent to Vorstand Judische Gemeinde (Undated); Alderman, *Modern*, 281.

come first.³² Not only would a boycott damage British trade, but it would disrupt the British policy of appeasement. This restrictive tone is unsurprising, given the priorities of the Jewish elite, yet it was not necessarily the attitude most British Jews hoped for.

Glasgow's approach to the boycott could not have contrasted more starkly with the position of Britain's Jewish leadership. Boycott was one of the first courses of action taken by the Glasgow Jewish Representative Council (GJRC) upon the news of Nazi terror. Meetings with Jewish businessmen were promptly organised and various sub-committees established.³³ However, conscious of their responsibilities as an official Jewish organisation, they refrained from declaring an official boycott.³⁴ Nonetheless, the GJRC still rigorously enforced the boycott at the individual level: in May 1934 they reprimanded a non-compliant wholesaler at a council meeting, in October 1935 they sought to reinvigorate boycott meetings, and in June 1938 they set about gathering data on levels of compliance in the community.³⁵

The mantle of the boycott was most fervently taken up by Glasgow's Jewish youth. From the outset, they keenly distributed certificates, posters, and flyers.³⁶ They cared little for official blessing, in either Glasgow or London, though this "presumptuous" attitude engendered some reproach from the GJRC, who raised concerns about potentially alienating non-Jews.³⁷ After the *Anschluss* and *Kristallnacht*, Glasgow Jewish youth were even less willing to comply with caution. They vociferously attacked the GJRC for not doing enough to advance the boycott at the Annual General Meeting on 8 March 1939.³⁸ This may have influenced the council's decision to officially

³² JE, 20 September 1933.

³³ Scottish Jewish Archive Centre (SJAC), Glasgow Jewish Representative Council Minute Book (GJRCMB), Meeting Minutes, 27 March 1933, 13 April 1933.

³⁴ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 13 December 1933.

³⁵ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 12 May 1934, 31 October 1935, 29 June 1938.

³⁶ JE, 1 September 1933, 8 September 1933; SJAC, Oral Histories, Interview FG.

³⁷ JE, 8 September 1933, 4 October 1933; SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 8 October 1933.

³⁸ SJAC, GJRCMB, AGM Minutes, 8 March 1939; JE, 17 March 1939.

associate itself with the Wholesale Traders' Association boycott a couple of months later.³⁹

This decision and the activism surrounding the boycott issue in the Glasgow Jewish community shows that it operated in a different political climate to the BoD. Much of the caution of official British Jewry came from their understanding of their duty as British citizens. However, the unassimilated nature of Glasgow Jews meant they struggled to place their British identity before a Jewish one. In fact, a spat between writers in the *Jewish Echo*, Glasgow's Jewish newspaper, reveals that to be called an "assimilationist Jew" was actually considered highly insulting.⁴⁰

Glasgow's reaction can be seen to have more in common with London's East End Jews, who were determined in their critique of conservative elite of British Jewry. It was East End Jews who formed the Jewish Representative Council for the Boycott of German Goods and Services (JRCB), which incorporated a diverse range of Jewish organisations and individuals who rejected the BoD's aversion to an official boycott.⁴¹ Cesarani notes that even the name of this organisation was a direct challenge to the authority of the BoD.⁴²

The question of official boycott in Glasgow was divisive, but this demonstrates that it was considered an important issue by many in the community. The same cannot be said for Manchester's apathetic attitude. The first discussion of the boycott at the Council for Manchester and Salford Jews' (CMSJ) meeting was on 28 June 1933.⁴³ Concern was expressed about, "agitation in certain quarters," for the BoD to declare an official boycott, presumably referring to the JRCB. However, the CMSJ and Nathan

³⁹ JE, 30 June 1939.

⁴⁰ JE, 2 June 1933, 9 June 1933.

⁴¹ David Cesarani, 'The Transformation of Communal Authority in Anglo-Jewry, 1914-1940', in: David Cesarani, *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry* (Oxford, 1990), 128.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 128.

⁴³ MCL, Council for Manchester and Salford Jews Minute Book (CMSJMB), Meeting Minutes, 28 June 1933.

Laski, the leader of Manchester Jewry and father of Neville Laski, stood by the BoD and passed a motion stating that an official boycott would be “undesirable.”⁴⁴

The boycott question was laid to rest until 1938, when the CMSJ received a letter from the JRCB, seeking a meeting between a boycott representative and the council’s executive committee.⁴⁵ However, any potential co-operation was quickly quashed.⁴⁶ This meant that “the matter would not now be re-opened and must be considered definitely closed.”⁴⁷ Clearly, the boycott was not considered high priority by Manchester’s Jewish leaders.

This decisive rejection of an official boycott, however, would not have been possible without the acquiescence of the Manchester Jewish community. In Glasgow, young Jews persistently urged the GJRC to enforce compliance and declare an official boycott even though the council had taken a comparatively proactive attitude on the issue. In fact, whereas Glasgow stood out for its enthusiasm for the boycott, Manchester stood out for its lack of commitment. Speaking at a meeting in Manchester, Simon Fine of the JRCB noted how the boycott has always “failed dismally” in Manchester, with disinterest from each section of the community.⁴⁸ This contrasts with “tremendous success” in cities like Glasgow.⁴⁹

Manchester’s response had more in common with that of official British Jewry than the Glasgow Jewish community. There are a few reasons for this. Firstly, even though it had a large immigrant community, the Manchester community was more comfortable with official Jewry’s anglicised attitude. It was represented at high levels through Neville Laski and these familial links would have increased co-operation. Not only was the Manchester community more assimilated, it was assimilating into a

⁴⁴ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 28 June 1933.

⁴⁵ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 26 Jan 1938.

⁴⁶ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 23 Feb 1938.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ MCL, Lucien Harris Papers (LHP), Newspaper Cutting, ‘Boycott of German Goods: Manchester’s Apathy’ (newspaper unnamed, undated).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

political and economic environment that was anathema to even the principle of boycott; Manchester was the doyen of British liberalism and free trade.⁵⁰

In the end, there were many who simply doubted the effectiveness of the boycott as a tool for combating Nazi Germany and the refugee problem.⁵¹ Assertions that it served more as a moral and psychological tool with which British Jews could assert their indignation were probably fairly accurate, if a touch cynical.⁵² Overall, it is apparent that boycott was far more important for Glasgow than Manchester Jews.

3. Fundraising

Fundraising for German Jews was the other prong of British Jewry's economic response to the Nazi regime. Whereas boycott strove to challenge the Nazis directly, fundraising aimed to ameliorate the worst of its excesses and assist the growing numbers of refugees. The Central British Fund for German Jewry (CBF) was the key institution in organising British Jewry's fundraising efforts and its first appeal was launched on 26 May 1933.⁵³ It incorporated Zionists and non-Zionists in what Alderman has called the "most delicate of balances."⁵⁴ This balance was crucial to create a comprehensive strategy and was an impressive achievement in such a disparate community.⁵⁵

The CBF focused on reconstruction rather than relief. Otto Schiff, who spearheaded British Jewry's response to the refugee crisis, reported on the situation in October 1933.⁵⁶ He outlined that in, "liquidating the refugee problem", he sought to stem relief and refocus on repatriation where possible and retraining or studying for

⁵⁰ Williams, *Jews*, 2.

⁵¹ Lipman, *History*, 193; Gewirtz, 'Boycott', 271; Langham, 250, 155.

⁵² JE, 4 October 1935; Gewirtz, 'Boycott', 261.

⁵³ Gottlieb, Amy Zahl, *Men of Vision: Anglo-Jewry's Aid to Victims of the Nazi Regime, 1933-45* (London, 1998), 30.

⁵⁴ Alderman, 275.

⁵⁵ Gottlieb, *Men*, 21.

⁵⁶ *Archives of the Holocaust, Vol. 3: Central Zionist Archives, 1933-3*, ed. Francis Nicosia (New York, 1990) Document 60: Report of Otto Schiff, 31 October 1933, 232.

emigration otherwise.⁵⁷ After 1936, appeals were launched by the Council for German Jewry, which unified international Jewish efforts to tackle persecution after the Nuremberg Laws.⁵⁸ To finance all these endeavours, the full and enthusiastic participation of all British Jewry was required.

In Glasgow, fundraising was one of the first ideas suggested upon the Nazi seizure of power at a GJRC meeting on 27 March 1933.⁵⁹ While waiting for a reply about this idea from London, the Jewish elite were busy establishing the CBF, which would subsume any independent efforts. The Glasgow community threw themselves wholeheartedly behind the CBF campaign, with £1800 already subscribed by 8 June 1933 and a committee formed to ingather these subscriptions.⁶⁰ Much of this enthusiasm was due to the reconstructive nature of the appeal and its focus on Palestine.⁶¹

However, enthusiasm waned. It was noted that the first appeal had been very successful and that the second one had raised a smaller but not negligible amount. However, few people had donated to the third appeal, launched in 1935, and the Glasgow Jewish community was urged to do more.⁶² By June 1936, the situation had not improved. At a GJRC meeting, it was noted that, “there was a certain amount of apathy among members of the community who should be more aware of their responsibilities.”⁶³ Though Glasgow still did its part, the levels of enthusiasm were incomparable to the boycott.

There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it reflected the decreasing enthusiasm which was seen across all of British Jewry. As Chaim Weizmann, Zionism’s leading figure throughout the interwar period, noted in July 1935, “the present drive required

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Gottlieb, *Men*, 68.

⁵⁹ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 27 March 1933.

⁶⁰ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 8 June 1933.

⁶¹ JE, 2 June 1933.

⁶² JE, 16 August 1935.

⁶³ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 4 May 1936.

much greater effort than the much greater amounts in the first two.”⁶⁴ However, there is also an explanation which is more specific to the Glasgow community. This was the feeling that there were other causes just as worthy of Glasgow’s funds, such as the United Polish appeal which assisted destitute Polish Jews. This point was raised at the meeting in June 1936 where the Glasgow community was chastised for not fulfilling its responsibilities to their German co-religionists.⁶⁵ This sentiment is likely driven by old prejudices within the European Jewish community.⁶⁶ *Ostjuden* felt that German Jews had always considered themselves morally and culturally superior.⁶⁷ Given the background of Glasgow’s Jewish community, it is unsurprising that they felt it just as important to assist fellow *Ostjuden* as the German Jews they felt shunned by.

In Manchester, the first CBF appeal in 1933 was extremely well received. This is unsurprising given that Nathan Laski was named one of the Vice Presidents of the appeal.⁶⁸ He commended the unity driving the appeal as proof of how much the German cause had struck people’s hearts. He also urged Manchester’s Jews to donate in accordance with their status as Britain’s second largest Jewish population.⁶⁹ As in Glasgow, a committee was organised to ingather funds.⁷⁰ Donations began with a staggering £20,000 from Simon Marks, the founder of Marks and Spencer’s and an ardent Zionist, as well as £500 from the Laski family.⁷¹

Manchester Jewry was able to maintain a fairly high level of interest in fundraising for German Jewry. Whenever reported on, the third appeal in 1935 was

⁶⁴ Chaim Weizmann, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. Series A, Letters, Vol. 15*, ed. Camillo Dresner (New Brunswick, 1978), 462.

⁶⁵ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 4 May 1936.

⁶⁶ Wasserstein, Bernard, *On the Eve: The Jews of Europe Before the Second World War* (London, 2012), 27-28.

⁶⁷ Collins, ‘Growth’, p.51; David Vital, *A People Apart: The Jews of Europe, 1789-1939* (Oxford, 1999), 814.

⁶⁸ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 25 May 1933.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 21 May 1933.

always doing well.⁷² However, the same interest was not apparent in the Polish appeal. Also in 1935, the Polish appeal's unsatisfactory progress was noted by Neville Laski during a visit to Manchester.⁷³ The preference for the German appeal over the Polish appeal is the exact opposite of the Glasgow Jewish position. Though Manchester also had a large population of *Ostjuden*, the comparative strength of its anglicised community and its more assimilated immigrant community meant that old prejudices held less influence.

As time went on, there was a growing perception that the problem in Germany was easing. Both Glasgow and Manchester had given generously to the German appeals, but they considered their responsibility for the problem to be coming to a close. This sentiment is captured by Nathan Laski's statement in April 1937 that Manchester's Jews had, "done their duty", by the German appeals.⁷⁴ The problem, however, was only to get worse. Yet by 1938, reconstruction and relief in Germany were no longer options. Fundraising no longer sought to prevent a crisis reaching British shores, but to assist refugees in this very endeavour. Fundraising was thus no longer a method to challenge the actions of the Nazi regime, but instead a resigned acceptance of its strength. Overall, there was consensus that fundraising was an important response to the refugee problem. Even in Glasgow, the need for the German appeal was never contested, only that it was not the sole issue. This level of unity is remarkable when compared to the more divisive issues of boycott and protest.

4. Protest

The BoD's hierarchy of interests, in which British availed over Jewish, applied to political protest as much as to boycott.⁷⁵ They were caught in a dilemma: between appearing too critical in the eyes of the British government and appearing too

⁷² MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 13 March 1935, 10 Nov 1935.

⁷³ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 20 June 1935, 28 July 1935.

⁷⁴ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 25 April 1937.

⁷⁵ Alderman, *Modern*, 274.

acquiescent in the eyes of British Jews.⁷⁶ As a middle ground, Neville Laski sought to encourage non-Jewish protests and co-operation, whilst discouraging the “mass hysteria” he associated with mass meetings and boycott.⁷⁷ The aim was to tackle fascism and Nazism as a threat to British values such as democracy and liberty rather than as an attack on Jews.

However, many British Jews viewed Laski’s approach as “platitudinous” and concluded that the Board was out of touch with the Jewish people.⁷⁸ In response, the militant left-wing Jewish People’s Council against Fascism and Anti-Semitism was formed in July 1936, dividing the Jewish community.⁷⁹ This new organisation incensed the traditionalist leaders of the British Jewry, but it was the provocation they perhaps needed to take firmer action.⁸⁰ The question of protest was thus deeply divisive. Whilst the upper echelons of British Jewry typically desired a more conservative approach to protesting the plight of German Jews, a growing number were tired of caution.

When Hitler came to power, the GJRC advocated protests which followed the wishes of the BoD.⁸¹ They held a mass meeting at Merchant’s House in May 1933, to which over 300 personal invitations had been sent, mostly to non-Jews.⁸² However, this approach jarred with Glasgow’s more radical elements. The council received a letter from the Jewish Workers’ Circle, who objected to the BoD’s suggestion that protests under socialist or communist auspices were ineffective. One member of the Workers’ Circle contrasted the work they did as, “the only activity actually being done,” with the BoD who simply, “didn’t want to know.”⁸³

⁷⁶ Langham, *History*, 137.

⁷⁷ MCL, NLP, Speech to Special Board Meeting of the Board of Deputies, 2 October 1935; Neville Laski, *Jewish Rights and Jewish Wrongs* (London, 1939), 138.

⁷⁸ Langham, *History*, 137; Aubrey Newman, *The Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-1985: A Brief Survey* (London, 1987), 25.

⁷⁹ Cesarani, ‘Transformation’, 129.

⁸⁰ Endelman, *Jews*, 212.

⁸¹ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes 13 April 1933.

⁸² JE, 28 April 1933; SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 11 May 1933.

⁸³ SJAC, Oral Histories, Interview MB.

Interest in protest waned slightly after this initial burst. Yet after the Nuremberg Laws, there were renewed calls for Jewish protest at a GJRC meeting on 31 October 1935. Enthusiasts cited their responsibility to educate non-Jews on the reality of life in Germany.⁸⁴ Glasgow's Jewish leaders, however, sought to dampen enthusiasm. They felt that protests had little effect, a point of view no doubt influenced by Neville Laski. Earlier that month, he said that Jewish protests "have relieved our feelings; they have manifested our resentment and self-respect. Yet it has still to be shown that they have had the slightest influence on the oppressor."⁸⁵

Events in 1938, however, changed this attitude as more desire for protest was complemented by less willingness to obstruct them. An ambitious proposal for the GJRC to organise all British Jewish communities to protest against "Nazi terrorism" and pressure the government into action was passed with a large majority.⁸⁶ Though the BoD vetoed this plan, it shows a fundamental change of heart within Glasgow's leadership and growing cynicism about "typical" BoD inaction.⁸⁷

Never ones to shun the limelight, or heed the Board's advice, Glasgow's Jewish youth proposed an even more adventurous scheme in November in the form of a planned protest march all the way to London.⁸⁸ However, this time it was the GJRC's turn to pillory the suggestion.⁸⁹ Instead, they convened a mass meeting of protest with the Lord Provost for all Glasgow citizens in December 1938. This was more in line with what the BoD wanted from protests: respectability and diversity.⁹⁰

Glasgow's Jewish community clearly considered protest an important element in their fight against the Nazi regime. The more cautious leadership were not against protests, they were just more selective about the form these should take. However,

⁸⁴ SJAC, GRJCMCMB, Meeting Minutes, 31 October 1935.

⁸⁵ JE, 4 October 1935.

⁸⁶ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 2 May 1938.

⁸⁷ SJAC, GJRCMB, Meeting Minutes, 29 June 1938.

⁸⁸ JE, 18 November 1938.

⁸⁹ Ibid.; JE, 25 November 1938.

⁹⁰ JE, 9 December 1938.

Glasgow's more radical Jews were determined to make their voices heard on the matter. As with the boycott, this section of Glasgow Jewry can be seen to have more in common with the East End Jews associated with the Jewish People's Council.⁹¹ In general, Glasgow Jewry's more left wing element is notable, but not surprising, given the socio-economic status of most of their community. Furthermore, just as Manchester's boycott apathy was influenced by their liberal environment, Glasgow Jews were no doubt influenced by the strength of left wing politics around them.⁹²

In Manchester, Hitler's ascent to power was marked by a protest meeting which was a veritable occasion of religious diversity and influential names. There were speeches by the Lord Mayor, the Bishop of Manchester, the Bishop of Salford, and the editor of the *Manchester Guardian*.⁹³ Not only did the meeting boast an impressive program, it was also one of the largest gatherings in the city for many years.⁹⁴

However, there was a notable lack of protest activity regarding the Hitler regime and the refugee problem in Manchester until 1938. The CSMJ's annual report for the year noted how it had been called on by various Jewish organisations to convene meetings of protest.⁹⁵ By the time these calls were made in late November, efforts were already underway to organise action.⁹⁶ As in 1933, good relations with the Christian community were vital for Manchester's Jewish leadership. They received the news of a protest meeting organised under the auspices of the Joint Council of Christian Churches in Manchester and Salford with a sense of elated gratitude.⁹⁷ Manchester, from start to finish, was exemplary in its execution of cross-community protest.

⁹¹ Ben Braber, *Jews in Glasgow 1879-1939: Immigration and Integration* (London, 2007), 39; Endelman, *Jews*, 208.

⁹² Braber, *Jews*, 39.

⁹³ JE, 21 April 1933.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ MCL, Council for Manchester and Salford Jews' Annual Report, 1938/9.

⁹⁶ MCL, CMSJMB, Meeting Minutes, 23 November 1938.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

The lack of protest activity against the Nazi regime in Manchester between 1933 and 1938 is easily explained. In part, it was down to wholly benign reasons; after initial outrage, the creation of organisations like the CBF meant British Jews could channel their anger into productive measures. However, there is also a more sinister aspect which deserves attention. During the 1930s, Britain's Jews had to face their own fascist threat in the form of the British Union of Fascists (BUF).⁹⁸ The BUF targeted Jewish areas of Manchester like Cheetham Hill and Strangeways in the same way they targeted London's East End.⁹⁹ Though a more benevolent police force and local authority saved Manchester from the same level of tensions as London, the effect was still profound both in terms of fear for immediate safety and fear for long term ideological consequences.¹⁰⁰ The *Manchester Guardian* highlighted that, right down to rhetorical tricks, the BUF's leader Oswald Mosley wished to imitate Hitler.¹⁰¹

Whilst the BUF presence in Manchester was not as strong as in the East End, it was far stronger than in Glasgow. Glasgow was no stranger to anti-Semitism.¹⁰² However, the BUF never gained much of a foothold.¹⁰³ Without such a proximate threat, Glasgow's radical Jews were free to devote more time to protesting the refugee crisis. Manchester Jews did not have this luxury. This can partly explain why Manchester witnessed less protest activity regarding the Nazi regime in the middle of the period. However, it is also down to the fact that Manchester simply had a proportionally smaller radical element than Glasgow. Gewirtz's work informs us that the vast majority of working class Jews in Manchester were mostly uninterested in left-

⁹⁸ Kushner, 'Impact', 195, 199.

⁹⁹ Gewirtz, 'Anti-Fascist', 22 ; Colin Holmes, *Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1976-1939* (London, 1979), 187.

¹⁰⁰ Gewirtz, 'Activity', 23.

¹⁰¹ *Manchester Guardian*, 16 October 1933.

¹⁰² SJAC, Oral Histories, Interview HD.

¹⁰³ Braber, *Jews*, 38; Gavin Bowd, *Fascist Scotland: Caledonia and the Far Right* (Edinburgh, 2013), 80.

wing politics.¹⁰⁴ The clout of radicals at the communal level was incomparable to that of Glasgow and thus pressure for protest was less significant.

On the whole, we should be cautious to not exaggerate the prevalence of protests in the British Jewish community. Though Glaswegian and Mancunian Jews responded to events, their responses were often tempered by fears of growing anti-Semitism and loyalty to appeasement.¹⁰⁵ The protests of 1938 were far grander because of the greater levels of persecution, but also because of a more sympathetic attitude from the government.¹⁰⁶ A greater convergence of British and Jewish sentiment eased the earlier fears of contradictions.

5. Conclusion

Overall, we can observe notable variety in Glasgow and Manchester's use of economic and political action to challenge the Nazi regime. The contrast between these communities' attitudes towards boycott could not have been more striking. Glasgow Jews berated their leaders for not doing enough, whilst Manchester's Jewish leaders suffered no such challenge despite taking meagre interest in the issue. Fundraising on the other hand was an opportunity for British Jews as a whole to excel in co-operation, even if there were grumbling reminders to remember the *Ostjuden* from Glasgow's Jewish community. Protests were another bone of contention for Glasgow's Jewish community and, like the boycott, demonstrated their ideological distance from London's Jewish elite. Though Manchester's protests towed the party line, they were often overshadowed by communal dangers.

These different responses can be attributed to the nuances of Jewish life in each city. Glasgow had a far larger left-wing contingent. When combined with a fierce sense of Jewishness and low levels of assimilation, it is unsurprising they found BoD's prescriptions hard to swallow. Manchester, on the other hand, found much more

¹⁰⁴ Gewirtz, 'Activity', 19.

¹⁰⁵ Braber, *Jews*, 39; Williams, *Jews*, 11.

¹⁰⁶ Endelman, *Jews*, 215.

ideological convergence with the BoD. Much of this can be explained by its more anglicised and liberal Jewish community, never mind the fact that Neville Laski was one of its own. These differences attest to the complexity of responses to the Nazi regime in British Jewish society and should encourage historians to broaden their horizons beyond London-centric analyses.

Structural restrictions created by BoD policy were either complimented or contested by the local political and social environment in Glasgow and Manchester. This raises the interesting question of how much agency local communities have when responding to such a brutal and aggressive international regime as Nazi Germany. Especially in a national and international political environment filled with trepidation and the fruitless hopes of appeasement. The efforts of Glasgow and Manchester Jews ultimately failed, yet their responsibility for this is doubtful.

Regardless of the outcome, the empathy and energy of Glasgow and Manchester Jewry remain a testimony to humanity in a time when these attributes were in short supply. Their approach enlightens us about the past, yet also provides an important lesson for the present: in the maelstrom of political apathy and international events, it remains possible to carve out a space, however small, for compassion.

Bibliography

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

(a) Manuscript Sources

- Scottish Jewish Archive Centre:

Glasgow Jewish Representative Council Minute Book

Oral Histories Collection

- Manchester Central Library:

M663 Council of Manchester and Salford Jews Minute Book

M249 Neville Laski Papers

M350 Lucien Harris Papers

(b) Published Primary Sources:

(i) Periodicals:

- *Jewish Echo*

- *Manchester Guardian*

(ii) Published Works:

- Weizmann, Chaim, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann. Series A, Letters, Vol. 15*, ed. Camillo Dresner (New Brunswick, 1978).

(iii) Source Collections:

- Nicosia, Francis, Ed., *Archives of the Holocaust, Vol. 3: Central Zionist Archives, 1933-39* (New York: Garland, 1990).

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

- Alderman, Geoffrey, *Modern British Jewry* (Oxford, 1992).

- Bermant, Chaim, *Troubled Eden: An Anatomy of British Jewry* (London, 1969).

- Braber, Ben, *Jews in Glasgow 1879-1939: Immigration and Integration* (London, 2007).

- Bowd, Gavin, *Fascist Scotland: Caledonia and the Far Right* (Edinburgh, 2013).

- Cesarani, David, 'The Transformation of Communal Authority in Anglo-Jewry, 1914-1940', in: David Cesarani (ed.), *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry* (Oxford, 1990).

- Collins, Kenneth E., 'The Growth and Development of Scottish Jewry, 1880-1940', in: Kenneth E. Collins (ed.), *Aspects of Scottish Jewry* (Glasgow, 1987).

- Collins, Kenneth E., *Second City Jewry: The Jews of Glasgow in the Age of Expansion, 1790-1919* (Glasgow, 1990).

- Dobkin, Monty, *More Tales of Manchester Jewry* (Manchester, 1994).

- Endelman, Todd, *The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000* (Berkeley, 2002).

- Gewirtz, Sharon, 'Anglo-Jewish Responses to Nazi Germany 1933-1939: The Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Board of Deputies of British Jews', *Journal of Contemporary History* 26 (1991), 255-76.

- Gewirtz, Sharon, 'Anti-Fascist Activity in Manchester's Jewish Community in the 1930s', *Manchester Region History Review* 4 (1990), 17-27.

- Gottlieb, Amy Zahl, *Men of Vision: Anglo-Jewry's Aid to Victims of the Nazi Regime, 1933-45* (London, 1998).

- Holmes, Colin, *Anti-Semitism in British Society, 1976-1939* (London, 1979).
- Kölmel, Rayner, 'German-Jewish Refugees in Scotland', in: Kenneth E. Collins (ed.), *Aspects of Scottish Jewry* (Glasgow, 1987).
- Langham, Raphael, *250 Years of Convention and Contention: A History of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-2010* (Edgware, 2010).
- Levy, Abraham, *The Origins of Scottish Jewry* (Glasgow, 1959).
- Lipman, V.D., *A History of the Jews in Britain since 1858* (Leicester, 1990).
- Livshin, Rosalyn, 'The Acculturation of the Children of Immigrant Jews in Manchester, 1890-1930', in: David Cesarani (ed.), *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry* (Oxford, 1990).
- London, Louise, *Whitehall and the Jews: British Immigration Policy, Jewish Refugees, and the Holocaust, 1933-1948* (Oxford, 2000).
- Newman, Aubrey, *The Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1760-1985: A Brief Survey* (London, 1987).
- Shimoni, Gideon, 'The Non-Zionists in Anglo-Jewry, 1937-48', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology* 28 (1986), 89-115.
- Vital, David, *A People Apart: The Jews of Europe, 1789-1939* (Oxford, 1999).
- Wasserstein, Bernard, *On the Eve: The Jews of Europe Before the Second World War* (London, 2012).
- Williams, Bill, 'East and West': Class and Community in Manchester Jewry, 1850-1914', in: David Cesarani (ed.), *The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry* (Oxford, 1990).
- Williams, Bill, *Jews and Other Foreigners: Manchester and the Rescue of Victims of European Fascism, 1933-1940* (Manchester, 2011).
- Williams, Bill, *Manchester Jewry: A Pictorial History, 1788-1988* (Manchester, 1988).

The United States' Influence on British Foreign Policy 1895-1939

Matthew McGinn

University of Nottingham

When David Cameron met President Obama at the G8/G20 summit in 2010, they jovially exchanged bottles of beer to settle a bet on England's World Cup clash with the United States ("US"), which ended in a 1-1 draw. Cameron chose an English bitter, Hobgoblin, and the US President reciprocated with a bottle of Goose Island 312, brewed in his home city of Chicago.¹ The exchange was symbolic of a warm and fruitful relationship. However, it would be inaccurate to portray the relationship between Britain and the US in the period 1895-1939 as being as close as that between Cameron and Obama. This essay will argue, in a chronological structure, that the US did not increasingly influence the direction of British foreign policy in this period. There was a gentle rise, with some fluctuations, in US influence until the early 1920s. Thereafter, US influence decreased and plateaued until early 1939, when the failure of the British policy of appeasement necessitated increased British dependence on Washington.

In order to contextualise American influence, this essay will consider the divergent trajectories of the two nations. America was growing in strength, while Britain was becoming relatively weaker; as a result, the two nations had sharply differing visions of how to shape the economic world order. Naturally, the US' gradual rise to pre-eminence necessitated that Britain engage increasingly with American wishes, but did not mean that Britain meekly acquiesced its power. The extent of US influence over British foreign policy was interconnected with this parallel theme of American progression and British decline.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to define the terms of the question. This essay will take 'US influence' to denote the power to produce effects, directly or indirectly, on

¹ BBC News, 'David Cameron presents Barack Obama with Graffiti Art', <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10710074>, 21 June 2010, (accessed: 20 February 2015).

the direction of British foreign policy. Direct influence will refer to Britain directing its foreign policy with a view to making it amenable to Washington. Indirect influence will refer to Britain shaping its foreign policy in reaction to American choices.

A perception of America as a significant power was forming within the British official mind by the end of the twentieth century, which allowed Washington to exert increasing direct influence over the direction of British foreign policy. Britain acquiesced to American supremacy in the Western hemisphere from Alaska to Venezuela by making a series of concessions, which were not reciprocated by the US. The Venezuela crisis, originating from a boundary dispute between British Guiana and Venezuela in 1895, was a watershed. The compliant British response gave Washington a clear indication that Britain no longer intended to challenge US interests in the Americas. Moreover, Campbell agrees with Dimbleby and Reynolds that Britain made all the concessions during this period of rapprochement, and adds that Britain certainly made all of the important ones.² Britain continued to grant concessions across the Atlantic, in the form of the Alaskan border dispute, but most notably by agreeing to the Hay-Pauncefote Canal Treaty, ratified in 1901.³

In London, there was a clear conviction that Britain had signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty to foster goodwill in Washington. Henry White, then Chargé d'Affairs in London, reported an acceptance in Britain that although the new treaty would exclusively benefit the US, it was a gesture of goodwill for which concessions might reasonably be expected elsewhere.⁴ This British approach, founded upon an expectation of reciprocal concessions, remained prevalent until the early 1920s; a tacit acknowledgment of America's gradual encroachment on British supremacy after 1895.

Coinciding with this approach, was an increasing apprehension towards American economic potential. Within this context, it is important to acknowledge the

² A.E. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903* (London, 1960), 27; D. Dimbleby and D. Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: the Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1989), 34.

³ Campbell, *Great Britain*, 48; For the Alaskan border dispute, see: Campbell, *Great Britain*, 89-127.

⁴ White to Hay, 23 December 1898, as quoted in: A. Nevins, *Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy, 1896-1906* (New York, 1928), 144-5.

role of Wall Street, as well as the White House, in influencing the direction of British foreign policy. Dimpleby and Reynolds argue that the 'takeover battles' of 1901-2 provoked a response of near panic in London.⁵ Orde accepts that the takeover battles cultivated apprehension, but differs from Dimpleby and Reynolds in viewing the impact of exponential growth in Anglo-American trade (£94.7m in 1870, £176.1m by 1900) as fundamental to creating the impression that American influence was permeating through the City of London.⁶ Thus, in the early twentieth century, increasing American power agitated and perpetuated an uneasy British attitude mixing hope, self-doubt, and fear.

The Great War exacerbated this unease. On 24 October 1916, British Chancellor Reginald McKenna warned Cabinet that 'by next June or earlier the President of America will be in a position to dictate his terms to us'.⁷ When McKenna issued this warning, Britain was hemorrhaging resources on the Great War and had become reliant on American credit and supplies. This contributed to an atmosphere conducive to American influence, as Britain continued to develop foreign policies amenable to the US, on the false hope that Washington would review or cancel Britain's crippling war debts. To this end, Dayer and Self agree that British foreign policy makers linked the abrogation of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance to the war debts issue, insofar as cooperation with the US in the Far East could lead to cancellation of the debts. However, they differ in that Dayer suggests that American officials encouraged British hope of this outcome until the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-2.⁸ Dayer's argument is not persuasive, given that no official document purports this to have been the American strategy. Moreover, President Wilson's explicit statement in November

⁵ Dimpleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 44.

⁶ A. Orde, *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956* (Basingstoke, 1996), 35

⁷ The National Archives (hereafter 'TNA'): CAB 24/2, G-87, McKenna, 'Our financial position in America', 24 October 1916.

⁸ R. Dayer, 'The British War Debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1920-1923', *Pacific Historical Review*, 45 (1976), 570; R. Self, 'Perception and Posture in Anglo-American Relations: The War Debt Controversy in the 'Official Mind', 1919-1940', *The International History Review*, 29 (2007), 302.

1920 that 'Congress will never agree to cancellation or reduction of the war debts' represents a considerable flaw in Dayer's argument.⁹

That said, although Dayer overstates the extent of American encouragement, it is highly probable that Lloyd-George reversed the direction of British policy in the Far East in order to satisfy Washington. On 30 May 1921, Cabinet decided to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on a temporary basis, yet by 30 June, Lloyd-George had reversed this decision and held that 'Britain cannot quarrel with the United States'.¹⁰ General Itami, the Japanese Military Attaché in London, responded to this *volte-face* with a prescient warning: 'you think the Americans will be so pleased that they will cancel your war debts; but they won't'.¹¹

General Itami's quotation encapsulates the rationale behind, and miscalculation of, British foreign policy in the years immediately following the conclusion of the Great War. In addition to abrogating the Anglo-Japanese alliance to satisfy Washington, Britain entered into an unattractive League of Nations Covenant proposed by President Wilson, because it appeared the price necessary to ensure the President's cooperation on other vital issues at Versailles. Indeed, the Australian Prime Minister, Billy Hughes, proposed confidently to 'give him [Wilson] a League of Nations and he will give us all the rest'.¹² Britain accepted the Covenant despite several officials, including Lloyd-George, expressing growing scepticism to Wilson's concept.¹³ American reciprocal concessions were not forthcoming. Additionally, Britain conceded parity in capital ships, and the symbol of thalassocracy, at the Washington Conference in February 1922.¹⁴ The expansion of the American Navy embodied the upward trajectory of the nation as a whole, and serves as a reminder that behind the veneer of

⁹ The Lloyd-George Papers: file F/60/1/3, 'Wilson to Lloyd-George', 3 November 1920.

¹⁰ TNA: C43/21, CAB 23, 'Cabinet Minutes', 30 May 1921; TNA: C56/21, CAB 23, 'Cabinet Minutes', 30 June 1921.

¹¹ M. Kennedy, *The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-1935* (Berkeley, 1969), 55.

¹² M. Dockrill and J. Goold., *Peace without promise, Britain and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919-1923* (London, 1981), 59.

¹³ Dimpleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 74.

¹⁴ See: B. McKercher (ed.), *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s* (Basingstoke, 1991), 23.

Atlanticism, Britain and the US were vying for power. As the veteran US diplomat Norman Davies has explained, if the US had cancelled Britain's war debts, Britain 'could win out against us'.¹⁵ The foreign policies of both nations were intrinsically linked to their struggle for supremacy.

In short, direct US influence over the direction of British foreign policy increased from 1895 and peaked between 1919-1922, as London made significant concessions in an attempt to reduce its crippling arrears. However, US influence decreased after 1922, as Britain became frustrated that its concessions were not delivering reciprocal benefits.

British frustration grew to the extent that by 1928, the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* stated that 'not for many years have the Americans and the British been on terms as bad as they are now. There is ill-feeling, suspicion, misunderstanding and estrangement'.¹⁶ The roots of British antagonism grew from the perception that the US had not acknowledged, or even comprehended, British sacrifices made up until the Washington Conference. Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, typified the anger felt by many British officials, when he lamented that Britain was 'always making concessions and always being told that the next step would change their attitude'.¹⁷ This statement may have been made in a moment of particular frustration, but it is no less instructive for this. Such feelings of betrayal, often on a personal level, made Britain less compliant to American wishes.

The weight of the war debts combined with the 'naval question' to ferment such feelings of betrayal. Reynolds pithily encapsulates the contemporary British perception that 'what the US had provided in gold, Britain had given in blood', and the satirical renaming of Uncle Sam as 'Uncle Shylock' was indicative of the widespread conviction that the US was punishing Britain for the sacrifices it had made between 1914-1918¹⁸. The 'naval question' also became increasingly acute in the 1920s and aroused passions in Britain, a country that German naval operations had brought close to starvation during

¹⁵ Self, 'Perception and Posture', 306.

¹⁶ C. Hall, *Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921-37* (Basingstoke, 1987), 58.

¹⁷ Hankey to Jones, 11 October 1928, as quoted in: Self, 'Perception and Posture', 304.

¹⁸ D. Reynolds, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41* (London, 1981), 15.

the Great War. It was symptomatic of the fractiousness of Anglo-American relations, stemming from the naval question, that following the failure of the 1927 Naval Disarmament Conference, there was serious discussion in the Foreign Office about the possibility of an Anglo-American war. The expert on America in the Foreign Office, R.L. Craigie, warned Cabinet in late 1928 that 'war is not unthinkable', a sentiment that Winston Churchill, the product of a trans-Atlantic marriage, had expressed as early as July 1927.¹⁹ It is clear that by the late 1920s, many of the British officialdom felt deeply resentful of America; creating a political atmosphere that was not conducive to American influence over British foreign policy.

In fact, Britain became tangibly resistant to American pressure. McKercher identifies 1926 as the point at which British frustration was manifested in tangible policy, when Herbert Hoover, then President Coolidge's Secretary of State, attacked Britain's monopoly of global rubber production. The Baldwin Government stood firm, and refused to increase production and lower prices.²⁰ Britain also resisted American encroachment in the Far East, and retained authority in China by the time of the Manchurian Crisis in 1931.²¹ The observations of Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, a highly respected commentator on international relations, are fascinating in this regard. In 1932, Wheeler-Bennett asserted that British antagonism to the US in the wake of the 1928 Anglo-French compromise was 'comparable only to that manifested towards Germany in the years 1908-1914'.²² This is an exaggeratory statement, particularly as Anglo-American relations warmed following Labour Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald's visit to the US in 1929, the first by a British Prime Minister. Nonetheless, Wheeler-Bennett's remark strengthens the important point that despite the gradual

¹⁹ TNA: PRO FO 371/12812, R.L. Craigie, 'Outstanding Problems affecting Anglo-American relations', 12 November 1928. For Winston Churchill quotation, see: Reynolds, *Anglo-American Alliance*, 91.

²⁰ B. McKercher, *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence in the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge, 1999), 28.

²¹ W.R. Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939* (Oxford, 1971), 131-133.

²² J. Wheeler-Bennett, *Disarmament and security since Locarno, 1925-31* (London, 1932), 142.

American ascent to global pre-eminence, Britain did not meekly bequeath its dominance to its former colony.

Offner and McKercher concur that in the 1930s, isolationism was central to American impotence in exerting direct influence over British foreign policy. It would have been illogical for Britain to place its vital interests in the hands of a nation that seemed content to use the Atlantic Ocean as a sufficient reason to avoid the major political questions.²³ Chamberlain substantiated this view in a remark to his sister in 1937; he worried that ‘after a lot of Ballyhoo the Americans will somehow fade out and leave us to carry all the blame and odium’.²⁴

The Wall Street Crash of 1929 was significant to Washington’s ability to influence British foreign policy, and its effect on the global economy showed how integral, and powerful, Wall Street had become. This is demonstrated by the failure of the Economic Conference in London in 1933 to continue following American withdrawal.²⁵ Nevertheless, recession decelerated the long-term trend towards American economic pre-eminence. It did not reverse this trend, but for a few years brought the balance slightly back in Britain’s favour and, crucially, created the perception in London that the US was not essential to British interests.

American influence plateaued at a low level in the 1930s, stemming from residual personal resentment and British reservations over the reliability of isolationist America. Stanley Baldwin’s resentment was apparent prior to his election in 1935; in October 1933 he refused to dine with President Roosevelt’s son, James, because he had ‘got to loath Americans so much as to hate meeting them’.²⁶ Self is accurate in arguing that this latent antipathy was relatively consistent throughout a generation of the British elite, and the extension of this was a conviction to remain intransigent to American pressure.

²³ A. Offner, *American appeasement: United States foreign policy and Germany, 1933-38* (Cambridge, 1969), 231; McKercher, *Transition of Power*, 115.

²⁴ TNA: NC 18/1/1032, The Chamberlain Papers, ‘Chamberlain to H. Chamberlain’, 17 December 1937.

²⁵ Dimpleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 101.

²⁶ Self, ‘Perception and Posture’, 310.

Such intransigence was evident in British discussion of its policy vis-à-vis Japan. Warren Fisher, the Head of the Home Civil Service, advocated 'accommodation and friendship' with Japan to replace subservience to Washington, and even suggested that Britain should 'disentangle from the USA' because 'they are of no use to us'.²⁷ Fisher did not propagate the prevailing attitude. Indeed, the under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robert Vansittart, who despite being married to an American had no love for American policy, held a more considered hope that 'the benefits of betterment would not all be thrown away in order to run after the Japanese'.²⁸ Regardless of the prevalence of Fisher's view, the fact that serious discussions took place at all shows a shift in British policy towards the pragmatic Palmerstonian axiom based on Britain 'having no eternal friends or enemies, only eternal interests'.²⁹ The US could not assist British foreign policy aims in the 1930s, and therefore could not influence its direction.

The situation was different in Europe where, in accordance with the terms defined in the introduction, the US indirectly influenced British foreign policy, insofar as American isolationism encouraged Britain to adopt a policy of appeasement. Chamberlain stated in January 1938 that 'in the absence of any powerful ally... we must adjust our foreign policy to our circumstances'.³⁰ This neatly summarises British thinking on the matter; it would have been imprudent for Britain to adopt a strong, antagonistic, stance against belligerent fascist states upon the assumption that the US would materially support Britain. American support could not be relied upon, thus the American decision to pursue neutrality indirectly influenced a British policy of appeasement.

Direct American influence over British foreign policy meaningfully increased for the first time since the early 1920s, as the German *Wehrmacht* entered Prague in March 1939, confirming the failure of appeasement. McKercher, Reynolds and MacDonald

²⁷ TNA: Fisher to Hankey, DRC Meeting 16, 12 February 1934.

²⁸ TNA: CAB/16/109, DRC Meeting 3, 4 December 1933.

²⁹ McKercher, *Transition of Power*, 48.

³⁰ Chamberlain to Mrs. Morton-Prince, 16 January 1938, as quoted in: Reynolds, *Anglo-American alliance*, 8.

share the conviction that the invasion of Prague was the point at which British and American interests collided, and Britain had to give American wishes more consideration.³¹ Despite some residual scepticism of the US in London, Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office pragmatically considered that it was 'better to become an American dominion than a German *Gau*'.³² Jebb's comment is of untold significance. It represents a realisation that the era of a *pax-Americana* was to replace that of a *pax-Britannica*, and that the cultivation of a 'special relationship' with the US would become the dominant stratagem of British diplomacy after 1939.

To conclude, the gradual rise in American power in the period 1895-1939 did not mean that the US increasingly influenced the direction of British foreign policy. Britain was unwilling to surrender its hegemonic status until absolutely necessary, and within this context, it is understandable that America was unable to increasingly influence British foreign policy. The importance of personal British resentment of America, particularly after 1922, should not be understated. The attitude of Baldwin and Chamberlain, among others, contrasts starkly to the beer-exchanging camaraderie of Cameron and Obama, and America stood little chance of significantly influencing Britain, when the British elite was so entrenched in its views.

Bibliography

I. ARCHIVAL SOURCES

- The National Archives, London (TNA):

CAB 23, 'War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes', File: C43/21: File relating to Cabinet meeting on 30 May 1921.

CAB 23, 'War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes', File: C56/21: File relating to Cabinet meeting on 30 June 1921.

CAB 24, 'War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda', File: G-87: File relating to a document written by R. McKenna, entitled 'Our financial position in America'.

³¹ McKercher, *Transition of Power*, 266; Reynolds, *Anglo-American alliance*, 48; C. MacDonald, *The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936-1939* (New York, 1981), 180.

³² G. Jebb, *The Memoirs of Gladwyn Jebb* (London, 1972), 90.

FO 371, 'Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence', File: FO 371/12812: File relating to a document written by R.L. Craigie, entitled 'Outstanding problems affecting Anglo-American relations', 12 November 1928.

2. PRIVATE PAPERS

- Lloyd-George Papers, The National Archives: File F/60/1/31, Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Lloyd-George, 3 November 1920.
- Neville Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library: File NC 18/1/1032, Letter from Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 17 December 1937.

3. PUBLISHED SOURCES

(a) Primary

- Jebb, G., *The Memoirs of Gladwyn Jebb* (London, 1972).
- Wheeler-Bennett, J., *Disarmament and security since Locarno, 1925-31* (London, 1932).

(b) Secondary

- Bell, C., 'The 'Special Relationship'', in: M. Leifer (ed.), *Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy* (London, 1972), 103-119.
- Campbell, A.E., *Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903* (London, 1960).
- Cohrs, P., 'The First 'Real' Peace Settlements after the First World War: Britain, the United States and the Accords of London and Locarno, 1923-1925', *Contemporary European History*, 12 (2003), 1-31.
- Costigliola, F., 'Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s', *The Journal of Economic History*, 37 (1977), 911-934.
- Dayer, R., 'The British War Debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1920-1923', *Pacific Historical Review*, 45 (1976), 569-595.
- Dimpleby, D. and Reynolds, D., *An Ocean Apart: the relationship between Britain and America in the twentieth century* (New York, 1989).
- Dockrill, M. and Goold, J., *Peace without promise, Britain and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919-1923* (London, 1981).

- Egerton, G., 'Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920', *The Historical Journal*, 21 (1978), 885-911.
- Hall, C., *Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921-37* (Basingstoke, 1987).
- Kennedy, M., *The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-1935* (Berkeley, 1969).
- Louis, W.R., *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939* (Oxford, 1971).
- MacDonald, C., *The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936-1939* (New York, 1981).
- McKercher, B (ed.), *Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s* (Basingstoke, 1991).
- McKercher, B., *Transition of Power: Britain's Loss of Global Pre-eminence in the United States, 1930-1945* (Cambridge, 1999).
- Nevins, A., *Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy, 1896-1906* (New York, 1928).
- Orde, A., *The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956* (Basingstoke, 1996).
- Perkins, B., *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (New York, 1968).
- Reynolds, D., 'Rethinking Anglo-American Relations', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 65 (1989), 89-111.
- Reynolds, D., *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41* (London, 1981).
- Self, R., 'Perception and Posture in Anglo-American Relations: The War Debt Controversy in the 'Official Mind', 1919-1940', *The International History Review*, 29/2 (2007), 282-312.
- Watt, D.C., *Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975* (Cambridge, 1984).

4. ONLINE SOURCES

- BBC News, 'David Cameron presents Barack Obama with Graffiti Art, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10710074>, 21 June 2010, (accessed: 20 February 2015).

Anti-Semitic policies of Vichy government – a reflection of the ‘hidden’ anti-Semitism of the French people?

Ana Vujanic

University of Bristol

This paper grew out of an interest to consider the role of the French government and people in their treatment of Jews during the Second World War. For many years, France hid behind the excuses that, primarily, they were victims of the Nazis - being occupied for five years. They also propagated the myth that it was better to have French laws imposing measures than to be solely reigned by German terror. Extending the myth, the French government said that the anti-Semitism evident in the policies of Vichy government were reserved to a ‘fanatical few’ and presented the image of France’s people as united resistance to the collaborationist government. By looking closer at the anti-Semitic values held by those in power in the Unoccupied Zone of France, understanding why such values were held, the way in which they were enacted and how they were received – the paper seeks to challenge the myths that are associated with Vichy. Was the anti-Semitism of government forcefully imposed on the French, or were the seeds of xenophobia already sown into the soil of the nation? Within every country that was involved in the Second World War, there were acts of courage and bravery retaliating against the terrors imposed by the Nazi regime. A range of historiography exists on the French resistance efforts and for years France disseminated these stories to bury the more honest version of events. This is no longer the case. For a number of reasons, from the 1980’s, the ‘Vichy Syndrome’¹ has been unveiled. Notable historian, Robert Paxton was the first to demystify stories that had been told over some thirty years – he revealed a darker side to the French involvement and broke from the narrative of the victim country at the mercy of the Nazi Germans.² French politicians

¹ H. Rousso, *Le Syndrome de Vichy: de 1944 à Nos Jours* (Editions du Seuil; Paris, 1990).

² R. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940 – 1944* (New York, 2001).

and academic literature of the Fourth (and to some extent, Fifth) Republic responded to accusations of their collaboration by stating that France had the third highest survival rate of Jews in the Second World War. This response is the result of government's manipulation of facts and figures, which will be considered later in the paper. Comparisons between atrocities are unfavourable, and not relevant to the analysis of history. There is little use in analysing which of the crimes is the 'worst', when all have death in abundance as a *leitmotif*. This essay is not seeking to shift blame from Germany to France, nor to accentuate one's crimes in order to dilute the others. Instead, it is presenting the argument that collaboration by the French government was supported by many of its people because of the inherent anti-Semitism which, prior to the German invasion of 1940, had been known as 'undefined xenophobia',³ was omnipresent in French society.

The Vichy Government was created after the Nazi conquest of France in June 1940. The incumbent Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, proposed moving the French government to North African territory and running the country from there. The alternative was replacing Reynaud with World War One hero, Marshal Philip Pétain, who 'seemed like a reassuring father figure who could restore confidence and stability.'⁴ Pétain took over and within a number of days, signed the Armistice with Germany, agreeing to peace from the French side and inadvertently allowing Germany to make use of the French soil and people. Though the surrender was a devastating blow to France, the Marshal was well received and millions of people tuned in to listen to his speech in which gave France the 'gift' of himself, to ease its troubles.⁵ Following the armistice, the French government left the Occupied Zone of the North of France and set up camp in the Southern town of Vichy, which was in the remit of the Free Zone. The new *État Français* took on an authoritarian colour, blaming the democratic Third Republic for the situation France was in. Pétain, aged eighty-four, was a traditionalist

³ P. Hyman, *From Dreyfus to Vichy: the Remaking of French Jewry, 1906 – 1939* (New York, 1979).

⁴ J. McMillan, *Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society 1898 – 1991* (London, 1992).

⁵ Speech recording played in documentary, *The Sorrow and the Pity*, dir. Marcel Ophuls, Arrow Films, (1969).

and though not a fascist, his ideologies reflected those of Hitler's quite remarkably. The old motto of 'liberty, equality, fraternity' was replaced with 'work, family, fatherland' with much emphasis placed on 'France for the French' and the protection of French blood from 'undesirables'. With the dissolution of Republican ideals of freedom and citizenship, the fate of the Jews could be foretold even then; the perfect political and cultural scapegoats would too be 'dissolved in time.'⁶

David Carroll wrote of his assurance that the 'primary goal' of Vichy's government was the legalisation and institutionalisation of anti-Semitism.⁷ This is evident by the policies passed to make the lives of Jews in France difficult and in the end, assisted them to their deaths. A few months after taking power, Petain issued the Jewish Statute in October 1940 which despite what Vichy apologists later claimed, was not imposed by the Germans.⁸ The Statue was the start of a thickening web of regulations against the Jews. It began by barring them from professions within the army, the press or civil service. It also permitted approximately 15,000 Jews to have their French citizenship revoked by the denaturalization process. In June 1941, the first Statute was revised and brought further impositions – barring them from any profession, commercial or industrial, and declaring all Jewish businesses to be registered. The second statute also enforced a census so that the authorities were aware of where every Jew lived, which later helped with the round-ups of 1942. The definition of what is was to be 'Jew' was widened so that a greater number of people could be labelled an 'undesirable.' Over the year, Vichy government issued twenty-six laws and twenty-four decrees on the Jews.

As early as October 1940, the legislation allowed the government to remove people it did not want from their midst. The first victims were Communists, foreign Jews, and criminals. A primary source written by political prisoner Arthur Koestler after he escaped from France and took residence in England, details his experience in an

⁶ P. Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France: a Political History from Leon Blum to the Present* (Oxford, 1992).

⁷ D. Carroll, 'What it meant to be a "Jew" in Vichy France: Xavier Vallat, State anti-Semitism and the Question of Assimilation', *SubStance* 27 (1998), 36-54.

⁸ J. Jackson, *The Dark Years 1940 – 1944* (Oxford, 2001).

internment camp in Le Vernet in the south of France.⁹ Conditions were every bit as bad as the Nazi concentration camps – rats, no washrooms, no kitchen, and five men in a wooden bed. According to Marrus and Paxton, Drancy (another internment camp) was ‘so lacking in basic facilities’ that Germans ordered nine hundred sick and dying internees to be released in October 1941.¹⁰ Jackson states that ‘conditions were so bad in French camps that about 3,000 Jews died in them from malnourishment and cold before the Final Solution had even begun.’¹¹ The situation only got worse when the virulent anti-Semite, Louis Darquier de Pellepoix became Commissioner for Jewish Affairs in 1942, after replacing Xavier Vallat. French policemen gave ‘invaluable assistance’ to the Germans in rounding up the Jews for deportation, the Vel d’Hiver roundup of July 1942 being the starkest example of collaboration. Around 13,000 Jews – 4,000 of which were children – were thrown together in inhumane conditions for five days before being put in cattle trains and sent to French internment camps, and later Auschwitz.

The distrust of Jews has followed them round since the beginning of time, with their people being blamed for the death of Christ, according to the Catholic Church. Though the Church’s influence in Europe had subsided by the twentieth century, people had still grown up with an idea of Jews having a ‘demonic nature.’¹² Another stereotype attributed to them, is their ‘wandering’ natures. Édouard Drumont, French journalist and writer, was particularly expressive on this point; ‘It is a race of nomads. When it has set up its camp somewhere, it destroys everything around it.’ In 1889 he founded the Anti-Semitic League of France, and founded the anti-Semitic newspaper, *La Libre Parole* as a means of advocating his take on the ‘Jewish problem.’ Such thoughts lent themselves to xenophobic fears of France losing its national identity. Once settled, the Jews would reveal their greedy tendencies and stop the French people from

⁹ A. Koestler, *Scum of the Earth* (Reprint; London, 1955).

¹⁰ M. Marrus and R. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York, 1981).

¹¹ J. Jackson, *Dark Years*.

¹² J. Parkes, *Antisemitism* (Chicago, 1963).

prospering – thereby producing the image of the ‘bloated rich’.¹³ Though it is true that some Jews, notably the banking family, Rothschild, were wealthy, the fact is that such vast wealth was only the case for a minority of Jews, and not earned only by Jews.

The most well-known and documented anti-Semitism in France before World War Two is the Dreyfus Affair beginning in 1894. Historian, Douglas Johnson assessed that the Affair ‘was able to crystallize a collection of resentments, fears and xenophobia because it presented the Jews in two of his traditional roles, conspirator and traitor.’¹⁴ What is of specific relevance of the Affair, is not the government’s actions but that the anti-Semitism had actually come from the anti-Dreyfusards - ordinary people – politicians, artists, businessmen.¹⁵ Even years after the affair, Maurice Barrès, France’s ‘prince of literature’ was quoted saying; ‘From his race, I deduce that Dreyfus was capable of treason.’¹⁶ After the First World War, France had a liberal immigration policy due to their declining birth rate and their depleted labour force. During the inter-war years, it is estimated that 150,000 Jews had come to France. A mixture of xenophobia, fear of losing ‘French identity’, the Great Depression and Catholicism as the main religion, meant that French soil was fertile for anti-Semitism. Robert Paxton declared the ideologies and policies of Vichy government to be French in origin and character, not German as was believed. ‘It was the expression of indigenous French urges for change, reform and revenge, nurtured in the 1930’s and made urgent and possible by defeat.’¹⁷ The Great Depression which hit France in 1934 was one of greatest reasons for the rampant xenophobia - later focussed anti-Semitism - that ensued. France was suffering from food shortages, unemployment, low wages and a general depletion in quality of life. As has always been the case, when the economy of a country is threatened, it is the

¹³ The Stavinsky Affair in 1934 did nothing to help this stereotype. It involved a Russian Jew who generated a financial scandal through his embezzlement in France.

¹⁴ D. Johnson, *France and the Dreyfus Affair* (London, 1966).

¹⁵ For example, Head of Military Intelligence, Colonel Picquard, thought Dreyfus was innocent, but he himself was a well-known anti-Semite.

¹⁶ M. Barrès, *Scenes et Doctrines du Nationalisme* (Plon, 1925), as quoted in: Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France*.

¹⁷ R. Paxton, *Vichy France*.

'foreigner' that is blamed for the difficulties that come with recession. In the context of France's other values, this meant that Jews, particularly 'foreign' and not yet assimilated Jews, became scapegoats. As early as 1934, press and politicians had no shame in propagating anti-Semitic messages, as seen by the treatment of Leon Blum, politician of the Left and later Prime Minister.

Leon Blum, Judas, native of Palestine... the complete traitor who turns your skin into money and gambles on your failure or blood [...] Shake off the Blums hooked to your shoulder, sucking your blood like a tic or a flea.¹⁸

Therefore, the myth that anti-Semitism was reserved for a 'fanatical minority' in the Vichy government seems unlikely to be true. Vichy's policy towards the Jews represented an intensification of an existing, indigenous anti-Semitism, indeed some historians suggesting that 'Vichy was really the anti-Dreyfusards revenge.'¹⁹ Having the legal affirmation of government, 'anti-Semitism had begun to rear its ugly head'²⁰ and people with whom those feelings had lay dormant, were encouraged to acknowledge them. The government's exercise of control over Jews was the only access to power they had. France's ego had been badly bruised by their surrender to Germany, and as a way of enhancing its own national status, it waged a war against its Jews in the hopes that by their elimination, France would become more French.

The trial of Xavier Vallat, the first Commissioner General of Jewish Affairs, gives a crucial insight into government's role in propagating anti-Semitic thought.²¹ Vallat's defence was that his anti-Semitism had been imbedded in him for as long as he could remember, therefore no aspect of his behaviour could be attributed to collaborating with the Germans. As a patriot, his sole aim was to 'return France to the French' and if the required action was to eliminate foreigners, then he would do as was necessary. This

¹⁸ J. Blacas, 'Sous l'eteinte juive', *Centre de Documentation et de Propaganda*, Paris, (accessed: April 2015).

¹⁹ P. Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France*.

²⁰ Pierre Mendes France interview in: *Sorrow and the Pity*.

²¹ Trial on 19th October 1946, as cited in: D. Carroll, 'What it meant to be a Jew'.

links to a seminal piece of work done by political theorist, Hannah Arendt in the sixties, who looked at the trial of Adolf Eichmann, SS Official in charge of Jewish Affairs for Nazi Germany. Her argument, which created much controversy, was that actually, Eichmann was not a racist, he was 'just' doing what was necessary for his country and following the law.²² Vallat concluded that German anti-Semitism was too extreme and upset French sensibilities therefore France was to implement its own policies to stay true to herself and in doing so, they could protect their Jews to some extent.

Was it not better that the French government take care of the Jewish problem, than to leave the entire moral and material responsibility to the occupation authorities? I myself think that it was better that the French government were involved.²³

In his trial, Vallat arrogantly claimed that many Jews owed their lives to him, for his rejection of Nazi orders (for example, he did not impose the Star of David to be worn), meant that many more Jews survived the Holocaust.²⁴ Marrus and Paxton are quick to comment on this point, more appropriately questioning 'whether more Jews were deported from France because of Vichy preparations and assistance than would have been the case if the Germans had to do it alone?' More directly, 'One can only speculate on how many fewer would have perished if the Nazis had been obliged to identify, arrest and transport without any French assistance every Jew in France whom they wished to slaughter.'²⁵

Then comes the paradox, that France, behind Italy and Finland, had the highest survival rate of Jews in all of Europe.²⁶ To challenge this, Marcel Ophuls, director of *The*

²² H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London, 1963).

²³ M.M. Martin, *Le Procès de Xavier Vallat (Présenté par ses amis)* (Editions du Conquistador; Paris, 1948), preface.

²⁴ Note that in 1942 de Pellepoix did impose this.

²⁵ R. Paxton, *Vichy France*.

²⁶ 22% of French Jewish population killed, versus 91% in Poland, 84% in Romania, and 71% in Holland, for example.

Sorrow and the Pity, when interviewing an ex-government member who was proudly relaying this myth, interrupted him with a different interpretation of the figures. 'France had a high rate of survival of French Jews, but the Jews who had been stripped of their citizenship or who had not been able to be granted citizenship, only had a five percent survival rate.'²⁷ In other words, the figures presented to the French nation and indeed the rest of the world, were significantly skewed in the sense that they omitted a huge proportion of Jews that they did assist to their deaths.

In considering whether the values of Vichy government were a reflection of what French society thought, it may be helpful to acknowledge the distinctions between people within the society; the French and the Jews, and within the Jews, sub-sections of 'State' Jews and immigrant Jews. In 1940, of the 300,000 Jews in France, half were 'French' and the other half foreign. The 'French' half (also known as Israelites) had 90,000 Jews from old, established families, while the other 60,000 were recently naturalized.²⁸ Tensions between the Israelites and immigrant Jews were ever present and the former desperately sought to distance themselves from the latter. This distinction was noted by Vichy government, as the immigrant Jews were seen as importers of inferior moral standards. Until 1942, the government treated the 'State' Jews fairly well, with Xavier Vallat adding exceptions to the Jewish Statute that Jewish war veterans could be exempt from the clauses of the law. No such exemptions existed for the foreigners and by 1941, 40,000 of them were in French internment camps. The difference between French and foreign Jews was crystalized.²⁹

French Jewry had the reputation of being the most successfully adapted Jewish community in Western Europe. This reputation had come from the fact that the Jews who had come to France were constantly proving their devotions and worthiness as French citizens and willing to renounce Judaism in order to be accepted. Eager to deny any notion of dual loyalty, French Jews became ardent spokesmen for public ideology of

²⁷ Marcel Ophuls, in: *Sorrow and the Pity*.

²⁸ S. Fogg., *The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France: Foreigners, Undesirables and Strangers* (Cambridge, 2009).

²⁹ S. Fogg, *Politics of Everyday Life*.

assimilation. Baron Rothschild in 1935 cautioned; 'with the crisis which rages in France, is born a xenophobia which degenerates too easily into anti-Semitism. [...] It is vital that foreign elements assimilate as soon as possible to the French elements.'³⁰ Despite their differences in social class, politics and ethnicity, immigrant and native Jews were bound in a complex web. Non-Jews made little distinction among the various classes of Jews and considered them all mutually responsible for each other's behaviour. The primary goal of the native Jewry was to successfully assimilate the immigrants as a way to abandon the stereotypes that France had attributed to them since the Middle Ages. Israelites saw it necessary in order to safeguard themselves and keep on the side of the French society which had so 'generously' allowed them in. This good-will was quickly revoked when the French started fearing that elimination of Jews would mean that Germans would start turning against the 'true' French.³¹

By the eve of WW2, the French Jewish community transformed. The institutional and ideological consensus created by the Republic was shattered; the next sacrifice of the French nation was made. Throughout the 1930's, the French Jewry continued to see anti-Semitism as an aberration imported from Germany, which was fuelled by the economic crisis that France was suffering. Alfred Berel of the Alliance Israélite wrote; 'it seems hardly plausible that France would desert her traditional doctrine of humanity and peace.'³² This refusal to accept the anti-Semitic roots of France is also seen in the diary of Raymond Lambert, director of the General Union of Jews in France. Lambert was in a difficult moral situation by working for the government, and lost favour with many of his fellow Jews, but it shows the naïve belief some of the French Jewry had in the country they believed to be their own.³³ When Lambert learned of the 1942 round-ups, he used the time he had before he was sent to a

³⁰ President of Paris Consistory addressing the General Assembly, as quoted in: Hyman, *Remaking of French Jewry*.

³¹ H. Sinder, 'Lights and Shades of Jewish Life in France, 1940-42', *Jewish Social Studies* 5 (1943), 367-82.

³² As quoted in: Hyman, *Remaking of the French Jewry*.

³³ R. Yerachmiel and Z. Szajowski, 'A Jewish Leader in Vichy France, 1940-43: The Diary of Raymond-Raoul Lambert', *Jewish Social Studies* 43 (1981), 291-310.

camp to prevent more round-ups from taking place. Though it may have been late, it is an example of some form of resistance from the French Jewry.

In a thought-provoking article by Daniel Lee, he takes note that recent historiography has made a shift from victims, to rescuers, the 'righteous among the nation,' who risked their lives for no financial or material motivation.³⁴ Both Hollywood and French cinema have sought to impose this narrative, for example, Quentin Tarantino's *Inglourious Basterds* opening scene shows a Jewish family hidden beneath the floorboards of a farmer's house. Also, the award winning *Elle s'appelait Sarah*, (translated into English as *Sarah's Key*) presents Niels Arestrup's heart wrenching performance as an old man who saved a little Jewish girl.³⁵ This mix of scholarly debate, contemporary cinema and politics, has been used to reinforce a stark contrast the awful crimes of Vichy government with ordinary French citizens. Without wanting to discredit the courage of those who did show some form of resistance or rescue, the proportion of those who took part in aiding the Jews in this time of vicious anti-Semitism was insufficient. An excerpt from *The Sorrow and the Pity* shows an interview with a member of the resistance who, when asked of his reasoning for action, he outlined his frustration that when he and his friends went to a restaurant, there would be no steak for them to eat because the Germans had eaten it and since he knew the cows had come Auvergne, it was 'our right to eat it, not to give it away.' Such an example appears a foolish reason to risk one's life in the fight against the Nazi regime, but also indicates that though figures may show a large number of resistance fighters in France, reasons for resisting would not necessarily be out of sympathy for the Jews.³⁶

Anti-Semitism was not reserved to just politicians and press; it influenced cultural life too. Many celebrated French literary figures were vehement anti-Semites and their literature captured the zeitgeist of the country. After the Liberation, Louis-

³⁴ D.Lee, 'The Chantiers de la Jeunesse, General de la Porte du Theil, and the Myth of the Rescue of the Jews in Vichy France', *French Historical Studies* 38 (2015), 139-70.

³⁵ *Elle s'appelait Sarah*, dir. Gilles Paquet-Brenner (2010).

³⁶ By 1944, it is estimated that there were 100,000 members of various resistance groups in France. See: C. N. Trueman, 'The French Resistance', http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/french_resistance.htm, 18 May 2015, (accessed: 10/08/2016).

Ferdinand Céline was convicted of collaboration and labelled a 'national disgrace'.³⁷ Nonetheless, during the war, his books were widely read, though German superintendent of propaganda in France, Bernhard Payer, said that Celine's 'savage and filthy slang' spoiled his 'good intentions' with 'hysterical wailing'.³⁸

They're a bunch of vampires! Of phenomenal pieces of filth! They must be sent to Hitler! [...] They have done us an immense wrong. They can no longer stay here.³⁹

Henri Sinder's article notes that such propaganda was particularly effective in small localities. He gives the example of a small country village in rural France where no farms or shops would sell food to Jews.⁴⁰ Pierre Mendès France's interview with Marcel Ophuls, discusses his trial on the count of 'desertion', which saw him put in jail. He talks of the crowd, 'the women, with faces full of hate for me [...] hoping for the cruellest of sentences.' His defence lawyer, Henri Rochet observed, 'there is no doubt that the people were heavily influenced by what was written in the press.'⁴¹ To suggest that the press indoctrinated the French people to the extent that it imposed on their behaviour is dubious. It is more likely that the influences of the range of anti-Semitic outlets further encouraged and reassured them of their anti-Semitism, which was a 'social fact in France' as suggested by Pierre Birnbaum.⁴²

That being said, the anti-Semitic poison of the French press cannot be overlooked. In November 1938, the Nazis launched their most violent attack on the German Jewry called 'Kristallnacht.' It saw 267 synagogues burned, 7000 Jewish shops

³⁷ Adelaide Docx, 'A Gentler Celine', <http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/a-gentler-cline>, 27 May 2013, (accessed: 10 August 2016).

³⁸ E. Andrew, 'George Grant's Celine, Thoughts on the Relation of Literature and Art', in: A. Davis, *George Grant and the Subversion of Modernity* (Toronto, 1996).

³⁹ L. F. Celine, *Trifles for a Massacre*, an unpublished English first edition. See: <http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres6/CELINETRIF.pdf>, (accessed: 10/08/2016).

⁴⁰ H. Sinder, 'Lights and Shades'.

⁴¹ *The Sorrow and the Pity*.

⁴² P. Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France*.

ruined 91 Jews killed and 30,000 sent to concentration camps. The French press did extend some degree of sympathy - right wing, *Le Matin* said that the Third Reich had gone 'beyond the pale of civilization and legality' but continued to protest the inadequate controls over foreigners.⁴³ Such sentiment was repeated across the spectrum. Charles Maurras, French writer and leader of extreme right-wing group, *L'Action Francaise* said, 'the prestige of France is not threatened when a synagogue somewhere is burned. One could very well burn them all; this is none of our business and it cannot in any way affect us.'⁴⁴

As considered throughout the article, the reasons for anti-Semitism were both long standing and circumstantial. One of the greatest motivators of anti-Semitism arguably came from a confusion of one's 'self' in France. The country had suffered constant issues about the 'national identity' and definitions of what it meant to be 'French' had been pervasive through all Revolutions. In the twentieth century, it seemed that France had achieved some of the stability it had envied of its Western competitors, and the idea of losing it to 'foreigners' was unfathomable. Though they took in immigrants for the reasons of labour and population, Elisa Camiscoli shed light to an interesting point of view concerning France's seemingly 'liberal' attitude to immigration. She suggested that their acceptance of European immigrants was because they deemed them to be 'biologically similar to French people' and therefore 'capable of cultural assimilation.' Though statistics may indicate France having an 'open door policy', it had a 'ranking' system to allow those who could provide them what they needed, with as little disruption to their 'French-ness.'⁴⁵ For generations, the assimilated French Jews had come to believe that they had blended in with the rest of the nation, but as soon as the prosperity of the country waivered, their 'darker' skin and values from the near East were brought to light. Pierre Poujade, French politician, made

⁴³ *Le Matin*, 'Les décisions "Légales" du Reich touchant les Juifs', Paris, 13 November 1938.

⁴⁴ As quoted in: V. Caron, 'Prelude to Vichy: France and the Jewish Refugees in the Era of Appeasement', *Journal of Contemporary History* 20 (1985), 157-176.

⁴⁵ E. Camiscoli, *Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC, 2009).

clear that to him, assimilation was a farce; 'Their citizenship is entirely flawed. Jews they were, Jews they remain.'⁴⁶

The years of Vichy government bear a heavy weight on France to this day. In post Nazi Germany, there was a silence that echoed through historic literature about the Holocaust, and only in the 1970s did people feel ready to confront the horrors of the regime. Studies in central and Eastern Europe dominated the field of study, while it was not until the 1980s that France too engaged in challenging the 'Vichy Syndrome.' One of the reasons that France's collaboration was left by the way side was because the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany overshadowed all other forms of anti-Semitic action, and for those who had been left unbearably scarred by the experience, they were willing to accept Germany as the culpable party. Anti-Semitism was 'untraceable' in French academic literature, the majority of books in contemporary France written by Anglophone historians.⁴⁷ The first prominent author was Robert Paxton with his *Vichy France: Old Guard, New Order* in 1972. At first, his work was poorly received by the French, especially by authoritative figures, who disregarded Paxton for the fact he was an American and 'could not understand the complexities of French society.'⁴⁸ France as a nation finally apologised for its role in the dark times in an historic speech made by President, Jacques Chirac in 1995. The speech, though of seminal importance, arguably served solely to propel another potential myth touched upon earlier in the essay, that of the 'justes' and those who aided the Jews during Nazi occupation.⁴⁹ France's avoidance of fault was also evident by the refusal to show Marcel Ophuls' *The Sorrow and the Pity* until 1981, twelve years after being released. Interviewee, Dr Claude Levy provided insightful thoughts on historiography in the documentary:

⁴⁶ Quoted in Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France*.

⁴⁷ P. Birnbaum, *Anti-Semitism in France*.

⁴⁸ D. Carroll, 'What it meant to be a "Jew"'.

⁴⁹ Jacques Chirac, 'Speech commemorating the Vel d'Hiv Roundup', July 16 1995, http://www.levendel.com/En/html/chirac-s_speech.html, (accessed 15/08/2016).

France is the only country in Europe who collaborated. Others signed armistice or surrendered. France voted laws even more racist than the Nuremburg laws. I understand history books only present the positive, but historically, that is wrong.⁵⁰

The reasons for this collaboration – be it active or in the form of apathy – included a significant number of French people. Contrary to the myths propagated by Vichy apologists, it does not seem as though the anti-Semitism was reserved to those who ran the Vichy government, it was a characteristic entrenched in a startling number of French citizens, in whom it may have been dormant, or who had consciously been suppressing it. What the Vichy government did was praise these feelings and turned them into legislation and policy. The extent to which it did so, with regards to the evidence presented in this essay, suggests that there was a strong correlation between what the people thought and what the government did.

What is even more striking about the issues discussed in this essay, is that anti-Semitism still persists in France. In 2015, in the wake of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, a lone gunman, took fifteen people hostage in a Jewish supermarket in Paris, killing four of them. Stephen Pollard, guest writer for *The Telegraph* and editor of *Jewish Chronicle*, reported the story began by stating; ‘The least surprising thing about today’s events [...] is that Jews are the target. Because when it comes to home grown anti-Semitism, France leads the world.’⁵¹ A survey conducted by the European Jewish Congress and Tel Aviv University found that:

⁵⁰ *Sorrow and the Pity*, (1969).

⁵¹ Stephen Pollard, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11335980/Antisemitism-in-France-the-exodus-has-begun.html>, 9th January 2015, (accessed: 15/04/2015).

France had more violent anti-Semitic incidents in 2013 than any other country in the world. Jews were the target of forty per cent of all racist crimes in France in 2013 – even though they comprise less than one per cent of the population.⁵²

Despite its initial success at covering up the extent of its collaboration with Nazi Germany, fabricating myths about the reasons it did, and then using its official apology in the 1990's to further manipulate the world by drawing attention to the 'righteous among the nation' who 'rescued' the Jews, this horrific incident of the present day indicates that France's anti-Semitism is a problem which is yet to be resolved.

Bibliography

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

- Céline, Louis Ferdinand, *Trifles for a Massacre*, 1937, <http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres6/CELINEtrif.pdf>, (accessed: 14/04/2015).
- Drumont, É., *La Dernière Bataille*, E. Dentu, 1890.
- Koestler, A., *Scum of the Earth* (Reprint; London, 1959).
- Henry Robert Petit, *Les Juifs Au Pouvoir*, <http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres10/Petitpouvoir.pdf>, (accessed: 14/04/2015).
- Sinder, Henri, 'Lights and Shades of Jewish Life in France, 1940-42', *Jewish Social Studies* 5 (1943), 367-82.
- Yad Vashem testimonies found on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=yad+vashem, (accessed: 10/04/2015).

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

- Arendt, H., *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London, 1963).
- Birnbaum, P., *Anti-Semitism in France; A Political History from Leon Blum to the Present* (Oxford, 1992).

⁵² Moshe Kantor Database for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism, European Jewish Congress, 'Anti-semitism Worldwide', 2013, http://www.eurojewcong.org/docs/antisemitism_worldwide_2013_report_tel_aviv_university.pdf, (accessed: 19/04/2015).

- Camiscoli, E., *Reproducing the French Race: immigration, intimacy and embodiment in the early 20th century* (Durham, NC, 2009).
- Caron, V., 'Prelude to Vichy: France and the Jewish Refugees in the Era of Appeasement', *Journal of Contemporary History* 20 (1985), 157-76.
- Carroll, D. 'What It Meant to Be "A Jew" in Vichy France: Xavier Vallat, State Anti-Semitism, and the Question of Assimilation', *SubStance* 27 (1998), 36-54.
- Davis A., *George Grant and the Subversion of Modernity* (Toronto, 1996).
- Fogg. S., *The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France: Foreigners, Undesirables and Strangers* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Hyman, P., *From Dreyfus to Vichy: the Remaking of French Jewry, 1906 - 1939* (New York, 1979).
- Jackson, J., *The Dark Years 1940 - 1944*, (Oxford, 2001).
- Johnson, D., *France and the Dreyfus Affair* (London, 1966).
- Lee, D., "The Chantiers de la Jeunesse, General de la Porte du Theil, and the Myth of the Rescue of the Jews in Vichy France', *French Historical Studies* 38 (2015), 139-70.
- Martin, M. M., *Le Proces de Xavier Vallat (Présenté par ses amis)* (Editions du Conquistador; Paris, 1948).
- Marrus, M, and R. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (New York, 1981).
- McMillan, J., *Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society 1898 - 1991* (London, 1992).
- Parkes, J., *Antisemitism* (Chicago, 1963).
- Paxton, R., *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940 - 1944* (New York, 2001).
- Rouso, H., *Le Syndrome de Vichy: de 1944 a Nos Jours* (Editions du Seuil; Paris, 1990).
- Yerachmiel R., C. and Z. Szajkowski, 'A Jewish Leader in Vichy France, 1940-43: The Diary of Raymond-Raoul Lambert', *Jewish Social Studies* 43 (1981), 291-310.

3. OTHER SOURCES

- Moshe Kantor Database for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism, European Jewish Congress, 'Anti-semitism Worldwide', 2013, [antisemitism_worldwide_2013_report_tel_aviv_university.pdf](#), (accessed: 19/04/2015).
- Chirac, Jacques, 'Speech commemorating the Vel d'Hiv Roundup', July 16 1995, http://www.levendel.com/En/html/chirac-s_speech.html, (accessed 15/08/2016).
- Pollard. Stephen, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11335980/Antisemitism-in-France-the-exodus-has-begun.html>, 9 January 2015, (accessed: 15/04/2015).
- Trueman, C. N., 'The French Resistance', http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/french_resistance.htm , 18 May 2015, (accessed: 10/08/2016).
- *Elle s'appelait Sarah/Sarah's Key*, directed by Paquet-Brenner G., (2010).
- *La Rafle*, directed by Bosch R., (2010).
- *Nuit et brouillard*, directed by Anatole Dauman, A., (1955).
- *Shoah*, Directed by Lanzmann, C., (1985).
- *The Sorrow and the Pity*, directed by Ophlus, M., (1969).

Conceptualisation and Advertisement in the Bolshevik Campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church, 1918-1922

Katie White

University of Exeter

Almost immediately after assuming power, the Bolshevik government encouraged hostility towards the Russian Orthodox Church. Framed as a general opposition towards religious faith, the primary target of their antireligious campaign was the Orthodox establishment. Historians widely recognise the ‘Russian duality of religion and monarchy’¹: the traditional relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and autocracy. This relationship posed a threat to an embryonic Bolshevik state in the midst of civil war. In conjunction with atheistic Marxist ideology, the power of the Russian Orthodox Church provided the impetus for Bolshevik policy regarding religion from 1918. This portfolio tracks the progress of the campaign against the Church up to 1922, when Lenin effectively withdrew from politics, from its original theory to its broadcast.

Historiography of this period primarily discusses the motivations behind Bolshevik antireligious policy, rather than the policy itself. Whether the government was motivated by Marxist ideology or the pragmatic desire to curb the extensive societal influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, or a combination of various degrees of both, has been the subject of historical debate. A comparison of source material from both private state proceedings and public transmissions not only highlight these motivations, but also a disparity between private policy-making and the announcement of these policies. This imbalance is crucial when considering the Bolshevik administration in a wider context, given the evident lack of transparency so early on.

Similarly, the antireligious campaign, as a feature of a wider study of Soviet history, provides a basis for the popular argument regarding Lenin’s character. Whether

¹ Dmitri Volkogonov, *Lenin Life and Legacy*, Harold Shukman (ed. and trans.) (London, 1994), 373.

Lenin was an idealistic revolutionary or brutal opportunist has proved a contentious issue; historians such as Stefan Possony and Adam Ulam painted an authoritarian picture of his character, epitomising prevailing attitudes during the Cold War.² A more recent revisionist movement, including historians such as Christopher Read, claims that Lenin was not authoritarian by nature, but that his revolutionary vision was instead naïve and unrealistic.³ Robert Service acts as a middle ground between the opposing interpretations with the publication of *Lenin: A Biography*, acknowledging aspects of both traits in Lenin's character.⁴ In aid of the debate, source material relating to the antireligious campaign widely features Lenin, who played a substantial role in the formulation of Bolshevik policy towards the Church. Analysis of this material reveals both his early, more abstract stance on religious faith, as well as his response to practical considerations when in power, acting as an ideal platform the discussion of Lenin as both a visionary and leader.

In more specific reference to the topic, however, historiography has not undergone many major shifts in the assessment of the Bolshevik campaign against the Orthodox Church. Felix Corley highlights this in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, citing that scholars wrote largely accurate accounts of the Bolshevik attitude towards religion before the opening of the archives, and that they were 'able to supplement their histories'⁵ with the material newly available. The archival material gradually released by the former Soviet Union therefore did not significantly change existing theories, but it did add weight to them.

Inevitably, however, debates over the antireligious campaign did occur, though perhaps on a smaller scale. The aspect of public reaction to the assault on the Church divides many historians. Largely, historians writing soon after the period tended to perpetuate the view encouraged by the Soviet government, claiming that 'it was not

² Stefan Possony, *Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary* (Chicago, 1964); Adam Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* (Harvard, 1998).

³ Christopher Read, *Lenin: A Revolutionary Life: A Post-Soviet Re-evaluation* (London, 2005), 97.

⁴ Robert Service, *Lenin: A Biography* (Harvard, 2000), 15.

⁵ Felix Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader* (Basingstoke, 1996), 1.

difficult to make the peasants see the church as merely another land owner whom they might destroy'.⁶ Source material regarding the reactions of the peasantry now available, though limited, seems to suggest otherwise. A revisionist movement in the 1970s challenged the previously accepted interpretation; Harvey Fireside argues that the Bolsheviks underestimated the extent of the Church's influence, arguing that 'the communist prophets erred decisively in their forecasts of the withering away of religion once their forces had seized power'.⁷ The reaction of the peasantry sheds light on the degree of effectiveness of Soviet policy against the Orthodox Church, and the success of its advertisement.

The shift in interpretation to assert that the Russian population resisted the campaign against the Church affects the analysis of the campaign as a whole. Assuming that the majority were opposed the campaign, given the strength of the Russian Orthodox faith amongst the lower classes especially, when analysing material in 1922 the harsher language and measures may be considered a reaction to the public's defence of the Church. The public reaction should be taken into account when discussing the progress of the campaign; increased hostility on the part of the state may not be exclusively attributed to the Bolshevik Party. Therefore, this portfolio aims to track Bolshevik attitudes towards religion from early Leninist theory to public declarations, whilst also considering the attitudes of the Russian population.

In order to build up an accurate sense of progression over time, the sources presented in the portfolio will follow a chronological structure. Considering each source's medium and audience provides the basis for the analysis of either the conceptualisation of Bolshevik policy or its announcement. In isolation, the motivations for each source's publication are highlighted, as well as the implications these have for Lenin's characterisation, where appropriate. The source analyses as a collection will provide insight into the shifts in Soviet policy from its conception to its intensification into 1922. In turn, these shifts will highlight the influence that

⁶ Boleslaw Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion: A Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925* (Notre Dame, 1959), 7.

⁷ Harvey Fireside, *Icon and the Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control* (Cambridge, MA, 1971), 25.

pragmatism had upon Soviet policy-making, despite its ideological basis. The study will focus exclusively on the Soviet state, making some reference to its effectiveness on the beliefs of the population, but will not discuss the reactions of the Church.

Discussing various genres of source is necessary to the study of the conception and subsequent communication of official policy. Lenin's article in 1909 is an early discussion of religion from an ideological standpoint, whereas the 'Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies' provides insight into initial Bolshevik religious policy in its public form. Likewise, the film revealing the remains of St Sergius is a more widely accessible representation of the Soviet government's attempts to undermine Russian Orthodox credibility. Writing in a provincial town, a diary excerpt from an Englishwoman provides insight into the public reception of Bolshevik antireligious policy and its effectiveness.

Contrastingly, 'Rozhdestvo', a poster circulated in 1921, is representative of the shift in the public representation of the Church, associating the holiday of Christmas with exploitation. Lenin's letter to Molotov in March 1922 and the subsequent Protocol produced by the Politburo a day later are invaluable to the study of the changes in rhetoric from private politics to the implementation of policy, as well as to the study of pragmatism as a factor in Lenin's character. Finally, the poster appealing to the citizens of Russia is a clear representation of the escalation of Soviet policy towards the Church, following the instructions disseminated to local officials by the central authorities in the 'Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo'.

Studying each source both in isolation and as part of a chronological progression of policy will expose the influences upon and the significance of the Bolsheviks' campaign against the Orthodox Church from 1918 to 1922. Largely, the portfolio in its entirety reveals the evolution of Bolshevik attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church, from ideological naivety to persecution by 1922.

I. 'The Attitude of The Workers' Party to Religion', 13 May 1909

Vladimir Lenin's published article is representative of his early view on religion and its function within Marxist theory, prior to the split of the Social Democratic Party into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. Writing in exile, Lenin is removed from Russian politics, at least physically; therefore the article acts as the closest representation of untempered ideology with which to compare later Soviet publications. Alternating between an abstract Marxist regard for religion and the practicality of its application to Russia, Lenin makes 'a public statement of [the Social Democrats'] attitude towards religion'.⁸

Given its publication in the Social-Democratic newspaper *Proletary*, the persuasive structure of Lenin's piece both aims to convince members within the Party of his approach to religion and acts to justify this interpretation to ideologically sympathetic readers. Though his theory permits private religious practice, Lenin 'does not regard the fight against the opium of the people, the fight against religious superstitions, etc., as a "private matter"'.⁹ This is the premise behind the conception of future Bolshevik policy towards the Orthodox Church, which attacks the power of organised religion over individual faith; Lenin's article here outlines the ideological foundation of the antireligious campaign.

Though Lenin consistently refers to works by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, such as Engels' *Anti-Dübring*,¹⁰ supporting his argument with accepted Marxist literature, he also argues for an adaptation of this abstract theory that appertains to Russian conditions. Defining the West as Western Europe, Lenin draws a distinction between Social Democracy in the West and in Russia. Claiming that bourgeois anti-clericalism in the West was in fact 'a means of drawing the attention of the working-

⁸ Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Leon Trotsky, 'The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion', in: Resistance Books (ed.), *Marxism, Socialism and Religion* (Chippendale, 2001), 88.

⁹ Marx et al., *Socialism and Religion*, 94.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 89.

class masses away from socialism',¹¹ Lenin alternatively suggests that in Russia the party of the proletariat should be the 'ideological leader in the struggle against all attributes of medievalism'.¹² The association drawn between religion and medievalism here implies that the Orthodox Church's ties to 'medieval' autocracy acted as a motivating factor for the future campaign against it, given Marxist theory surrounding the progression of history, from feudal 'medievalism' to utopian communism.¹³

More practically, distinguishing between Russian and Western conditions allows Lenin to carve out a uniquely Russian form of Marxism that may differ from original theory formulated by Western European socialists. Following this logic, any adaptation of Marxist theory may be employed to justify policies that are not strictly Marxist, given that the Social Democratic party is defined here as 'ideological leader', rather than employing Western Marxism as a guide.

This justification of ideological pragmatism is evident in Lenin's essential argument: an outright assault on religion would be premature and damaging to the Social Democrats' primary concern over the development of the class struggle. The subordination of atheism to the task of class warfare prevents divisions based on religious faith within individual classes. Maintaining a sense of unity within the largely religious proletariat by focusing on opposition to the bourgeoisie, rather than the Orthodox faith, would theoretically increase support for socialist parties. From this, the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War and the supposed resolution of the issue of class struggle perhaps allowed for the intensification of atheist propaganda in 1922.

Though Lenin proposes the view that religious faith should be personal and not in the political interest of the Social Democrats if so practised, his article also indicates that Marxist materialism should eventually overpower religion.¹⁴ John Maynard

¹¹ Ibid., 95.

¹² Ibid., 96.

¹³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1848, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf>, (accessed: 31/07/2016).

¹⁴ Marx et al., *Socialism and Religion*, 91.

identifies this ‘insistence upon materialism’¹⁵ as the catalyst for the Bolshevik Party’s increased emphasis upon its policy against the Russian Orthodox Church when in power. Therefore, Lenin’s article does not solely provide early indications of his attitude towards religion, but also helps to lay the ideological foundations for later Soviet antireligious policy. The simultaneous reliance upon Marxist justification and ideological pragmatism, which is predominantly a reaction to the strong influence of the Orthodox religion upon traditional Russian politics, in the formation of this article’s argument mirror Bolshevik approaches during its antireligious campaign.

2. ‘Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies’, 23 January 1918

Though its title suggests guaranteeing the freedom of religious practice, the clauses of the ‘Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies’ in actuality curbed the official power exercised by the Orthodox Church. Signed by the Council of People’s Commissars, including its President, Lenin, the Decree was published in *Gazette of the Workmen and Peasant Government* on 23 January 1918,¹⁶ thereby ‘becoming law’.¹⁷ The source was independently translated in 1959 by Boris Szczesniak as part of a collection of unpublished documents concerning the ‘atheistic persecution of religion’¹⁸ by the Soviets.

The Bolsheviks issued this decree soon after their rise to power, aiming to undermine the state power enjoyed by the Orthodox Church under tsarism, as well as to damage its social influence. The opening stipulation, that ‘the church is separated from the state’,¹⁹ leaves no room for ambiguity and definitively qualifies the premise of

¹⁵ John Maynard, *The Russian Peasant and Other Studies* (Suffolk, 1942), 357.

¹⁶ Council of People’s Commissars, ‘Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies (1918)’, in: Boleslaw Szczesniak (ed. and trans.), *The Russian Revolution and Religion: A Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925* (Notre Dame, 1959), 34-35.

¹⁷ John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook The World*, (New edition; Aylesbury, 1977), 321.

¹⁸ Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, ix.

¹⁹ Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, 34.

the document. The decree transfers all legal registration of births, marriages and deaths to civic entities, prohibits taxation that funds religious institutions and removes religious education from ‘all state, public and also private educational establishments’.²⁰ These clauses target the powerful presence of the institution of the Russian Orthodox Church and its connection to the state, rather than individual faith.

The restriction of the Orthodox Church’s power proposed is enforced by the document’s rhetoric, which refers to the institution consistently as a ‘church’,²¹ rather than the proper noun; the Soviets did not recognise the Russian Orthodox Church as an official organisation. Historian Felix Corley identifies this subtle linguistic change when referencing the Church in official Soviet documents as a trend lasting into the 1980s.²² In a similar use of language, reducing the power of the Church’s official role in society is described as ‘freedom’²³ in the document, rather than constraint. Used in conjunction, these techniques equally temper the repressive policies laid out in the decree, and reinforce them; the rhetoric reassures the average religious citizen of his right to practice freely as an individual, whilst simultaneously relegating the Church to an unrecognised entity.

However, an issue then arises over readership and audience. Though all Bolshevik laws were published in ‘the official *Gazette of the Provisional Workmen’s and Peasants’ Government*’²⁴, the likelihood of these being communicated to all levels of Russian society was low. Although no precise figure can be pinpointed, at the time of the October Revolution, more than sixty percent of Russia’s population was illiterate.²⁵ Even with the decree in circulation, the majority of the population would have little idea as to its contents.

²⁰ Ibid., 35

²¹ Ibid., 35.

²² Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, x.

²³ Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, 34.

²⁴ Reed, *Ten Days That Shook The World*, 321.

²⁵ Ben Eklof, ‘Russian Literacy Campaigns 1861–1939’, in: Robert F. Arnove and Harvey J. Graff (eds.) *National Literacy Campaigns and Movements: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (New Brunswick, 2008), 128–29.

Similarly redundant is the clause stipulating that ‘the property of all church and religious associations existing in Russia is pronounced the property of the People’.²⁶ When considered in isolation, the assertion seems rousing, whereas in reality church property had started to be nationalised prior even to the October Revolution under the Provisional Government.²⁷ Nevertheless, the decree in 1918 legalised the practice and served as another demoralising blow to the Orthodox establishment.

Though declarative statements, such as ‘the school is separated from the church’,²⁸ qualify many of the decree’s stipulations, some terms are left ambiguous. The power given to ‘local authorities ... to adopt all necessary measures for maintenance of public order and safety’,²⁹ for example, lends unrestricted power to Bolshevik representatives to maintain whatever they deem to qualify as ‘order and safety’. Fundamentally, the decree is founded in ideological pragmatism, as assessed by Russian Orthodox Church Council: ‘under the pretext of separating church and state, the Council of People’s Commissars attempts to make impossible the very existence of churches, church institutions, and the clergy’.³⁰ The Bolshevik ‘Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies’ in 1918 represents an offensive against organised religion and the institutions of Russian Orthodoxy. The move was ‘aimed at directly attacking the Church’s material means of existence’.³¹

3. ‘Revealing the Remains of St Sergius’, 1919

In 1919, the Bolshevik state experimented with film as an outlet for the proliferation of the campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church, producing a short clip that depicts

²⁶ Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, 35.

²⁷ Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924* (London, 1994), 340.

²⁸ Szczesniak, *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, 34.

²⁹ Ibid. .

³⁰ Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924*, 344.

³¹ James Ryan, *Lenin’s Terror* (Abingdon, 2012), 177.

the unveiling of the remains of Saint Sergius of Radonezh.³² St Sergius was revered by the followers of the Russian Orthodox faith and hailed by many as ‘the greatest national saint of Russia’,³³ whose remains were housed in the Holy Trinity Lavra.³⁴ The film exposes one of the most ingrained traditions of the Orthodox Church as fraudulent in an attempt to spread disillusionment amongst the faithful Russian population.

According to the Russian Orthodox faith, after death the body of a saint is preserved.³⁵ In March of 1919, a government decree was issued, calling for the ‘complete liquidation of the cult of corpses and mummies’.³⁶ The slightly clumsy film formed part of this stage of the campaign, and the supposed remains of the saint are clearly decomposed, thus exposing the myth propagated by the Orthodox Church regarding the preservation of a saint’s body. Though the remains portrayed in the film cannot be verified, supplementary accounts confirm that the exposure of the saint’s remains did in fact take place, revealing ‘nothing but cotton-wool, hair, rotten bones and dust in his shrine’.³⁷

Aside from its overt purpose to disprove a core belief of the Russian Orthodox Church, the film also sought to challenge the strength of the Russian population’s faith. By including a scene that films a solemn but compliant crowd of onlookers, the Bolsheviks seek to enhance their own credibility; exposing the saint’s remains is an act of service to the people. The exposure of a holy figure was met with little recognition by the crowd cast in the film, highlighting the Bolsheviks’ dismissive regard for the power of the Russian Orthodox Church.

³² Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, ‘Revealing the Remains of St Sergius’ (1919), <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/conflict-with-the-church/conflict-with-the-church-video/revealing-the-remains-of-st-sergius-1919/>, (accessed 31/07/2016).

³³ Michael Bourdeaux, *Opium of the People: The Christian Religion in the USSR* (Oxford, 1965), 22.

³⁴ Jennifer Wynot, *Keeping the Faith: Russian Orthodox Monasticism in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939* (Texas, 2004), 45.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

³⁶ Dmitri Pospelovsky, *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions*, 3 vols. (Volume 2; Basingstoke, 1988), 19.

³⁷ Pospelovsky, *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions*, 19.

The text shown in the film serves to reinforce the Soviet appeal to the Russian population. The first use of text introduces ‘the expert, Dr Popov’,³⁸ in an attempt to pit scientific rationality against the mythical tradition of the Orthodox Church. Extending this juxtaposition of reality and tradition, the second section reads:

Taking the last hard-earned pennies from suffering beggars and benighted folk, priests and monks said like they had for five centuries: “For here like the bright sun shining, lie your hallowed remains, uncorrupted, like a fragrant blossom...”, while standing over this pile of rotten rags, dead pitch and fragments of bone.³⁹

Juxtaposing ‘fragrant blossom’ and a ‘pile of rotten rags’ reveals the disparity between the clergy’s rhetoric and the reality of the remains, casting doubt over the reliability of Russian Orthodox claims. Simultaneously, the clergy are described as immoral criminals, stealing from ‘suffering beggars’ in order to fund their practice. The text aims to build support for a fragile Bolshevik Party during the Civil War, by placing emphasis upon the financial comfort of the Russian Orthodox Church.

However, the circulation of the film amongst the Russian population is not referenced. Whether it ever reached the majority of the population is doubtful, given its medium. The exposure of the Saint’s remains at the time, according to Jennifer Wynot, produced ‘great resistance from the local population’⁴⁰ and a surge into the Lavra past Red Army guards.⁴¹ Dmitri Pospelovsky’s narrative, however, diametrically opposes this claim, describing onlookers to not ‘hold a grudge against the Soviet government anymore. [...] An age-old fraud has been made naked in the eyes of the nation’.⁴² Regardless, whether any reaction was as a direct result of the film’s production is uncertain, given the impracticalities of its distribution; in reality, the film most likely

³⁸ Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, ‘Revealing the Remains of St Sergius’. Translation my own.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Wynot, *Keeping the Faith: Russian Orthodox Monasticism in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939*, 45.

⁴¹ Ibid., 46.

⁴² Pospelovsky, *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions*, 19.

acts as a valuable source for historians studying the methods by which the Bolsheviks sought to undermine the Russian Orthodox Church, rather than their effect.

4. 'From a Russian Diary: 1917 – 1920', 23 – 24 August 1918

From 1917 to 1920, an unnamed Englishwoman chronicled her experience in a diary, entitled *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, while living in a provincial town just outside Moscow.⁴³ Entries from August 23 and 24 in 1918, especially, describe the implementation of early antireligious policy in the provinces. Equally, the excerpts convey the inefficiency of Bolshevik communication in more rural areas.

Importantly, the author writes in English, meaning that the source material has not been altered in translation, as with many other written primary sources from the Soviet period. Inevitably though, the subjective nature of a diary limits its value, acknowledged by the author: 'each day brought so many events that if I failed to write them down in the evening they usually remained altogether unwritten'.⁴⁴ Similarly limiting is the evidence of self-censorship, perhaps a consequence of the culture of fear that she accurately recreates in the extracts. Firstly, leaving the publication anonymous points to a certain amount of self-preservation. In the same vein, the omission of many names in the diary, such as 'X—s',⁴⁵ acts to ensure the safety of those unnamed. Perhaps even more revealing is the recall of the seizure of 'an awkward letter of Maria Petrovna's [...] last night; perhaps they won't understand it'.⁴⁶ From this, evidence presented must be considered as work written under a suspicious regime in the beginnings of a Civil War: fear of discovery played an inevitable part in its compilation. Nevertheless, the diary is an invaluable component of the study of the implementation of Bolshevik policy in the provinces; it is one of only a few first hand documents from rural Russia, due to low literacy rates.

⁴³ Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920* (London, 1921), xix.

⁴⁴ Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, viii.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 124.

With this in mind, the ignorance of characters in the extract to the intentions of the Bolshevik Party towards the Orthodox Church is somewhat explained. Characters base much of their knowledge on rumours. The author attempts to assess the validity of these: 'to-day many say that the Abbot has been shot; probably not true; of course the W- Hospital has a bad name; that, in fact, may be the origin of the rumours'.⁴⁷ Despite this, the author often could have no way of knowing the truth, as it is not officially communicated. Another contributing factor to the culture of fear is the militarised nature of the provincial regime; the author makes reference to conscription, Red Guards, house searches and arrests.⁴⁸ The combination of imposed ignorance and military presence stimulates the fear that permeates the passage.

The fear instilled in the described population aided the implementation of anti-religious policy in the provinces. Though monks rang the tocsin on August 23, prompting a popular gathering at the monastery in its defence, the presence of Red Guards dispersed the crowd.⁴⁹ Further, Bolshevik representatives deceived the population into thinking the tocsin acted as a fire alarm, allowing for the arrest of the Abbot.⁵⁰ This incident reflects the Bolsheviks' use of pragmatism generally, when dealing with the Russian Orthodox Church. Though justified ideologically, essentially policies dealing with the Church allowed the Bolsheviks to combat the powerful threat that was posed by organised religion.

Evidence of the Bolshevik attack on Russian Orthodox institutions is presented in the source. During the night between August 23 and 24, 'the ropes of all church bells [were] cut, so that the tocsin [could not] be rung'.⁵¹ On a literal level, the action cut off the church's ability to warn citizens of any attack on the church. In a more symbolic sense, the church lost another link to its followers; the author evidences a renewed

⁴⁷ Ibid., 124.

⁴⁸ Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, 123-125.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 123.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 123.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 125.

attempt by the Bolsheviks to detach the Orthodox Church from society, focusing on its support base, rather than its state functions as before.

The author is in a rare position, as she is able to comment first hand upon Bolshevik policy from a narrow provincial focus. Similarly unique is her perspective: *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, published in 1921 by John Murray, is demonstrative of the publisher's mantra; 'controversy, dissent and debate [are] encouraged and fostered'.⁵² Fulfilling this controversial ideal, the author is apparently anti-Bolshevik, which is a rarity amongst foreigners in Russia at the time. In the foreword, the author describes the impending October Revolution as 'much treachery and treason'.⁵³ Many other English-speaking visitors to Russia were idealistic communists; the Englishwoman's diary is not clouded by communist ideology, providing a practical analysis of life under the Bolsheviks.

⁵² Hachette, 'John Murray: The UK's oldest publishing house', <https://www.hachette.co.uk/Articles/Group+Company+Info+Pages/John+Murray+info+page.page>, (accessed: 31/07/2016).

⁵³ Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, v.

5. 'Rozhdestvo', 1921



Figure 1.54

Dmitrii Moor created 'Rozhdestvo', or 'Christmas', a poster issued by 'Gosudarstvennoe Izd.', the state publishing house, in 1921. Moor later became chief artist for *Bezbozhnik*, or 'Godless', a Bolshevik publication that produced short articles and cartoons 'ridiculing religious beliefs'.⁵⁵ Harold Fleming donated a copy of the poster, which he collected while working as a field inspector for the American Relief Administration, to the New York Public Library Digital Collection in the 1970s.⁵⁶ 'Rozhdestvo' sets up a contrast between a seemingly traditional Christmas scene in the top panel and the Bolshevik equivalent in the bottom section. Given its medium, the poster is much more accessible to the largely illiterate Russian proletariat, the target

⁵⁴ Dmitrii Stakhievich Moor, 'Rozhdestvo', 1921. Available at: <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-4060-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>, (accessed: 31/07/2016).

⁵⁵ Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924*, p. 359.

⁵⁶ New York Public Library Digital Collections, 'Harold M. Fleming Papers, 1917-1971: Posters'. Available at: <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/collections/harold-m-fleming-papers-1917-1971-posters/#/?tab=about> (accessed: 31/07/2016).

audience. Associating the Russian Orthodox Church with capitalist oppression and militarism, the poster offers its audience an alternative: Marxism.

The poster juxtaposes the Russian Orthodox Church and Bolshevism by depicting both within the context of the celebration of Russian Orthodox Christmas. Immediately, the divide is apparent; the scenes are focused on opposite edges of the poster and the top panel is set in darkness, whereas the lower scene is set at dawn. Figuratively, the Russian Orthodox section, set at night, symbolises an old, out-dated system, and the Bolshevik panel below, set at sunrise, represents the new, brighter alternative. A direct visual comparison between the two celebrations enables a clear analysis of the poster's message.

Focusing on the upper section of the poster illustrates the link between Russian Orthodoxy and the previous Russian capitalist regime under tsarism. The religious figures on camels to the left of the panel are turned to face the back of the procession, which consists of military leaders and the traditional representatives of capitalism: older, overweight men dressed in suits and top hats. Additionally, the heads of the members of the clergy are bowed as if in submission, and military forces segregate the religious representatives in the scene. These elements combine to convey the powerlessness and inferiority of religion, and its obedience to capitalist authority. The composition of the top panel communicates the dominance of the bourgeois over the Russian Orthodox Church.

In comparison to the portrayed weakness of the Russian Orthodox Church, the bottom section of the poster celebrates the strength of the Bolshevik vision. The banner in the foreground reads, 'Long live the global army of workers!' and the men depicted fit the Marxist worker ideal; they are well built and wear modest clothing that is uniformly red, blue and black. Furthermore, the workers all look towards the communist symbol of the red star to the right of the panel. The combination of the text, the uniform and synchronised stance of the characters in the lower section present a united front of Bolshevik resistance to the Russian Orthodox Church, and its links to capitalism.

Bolshevik opposition to capitalism is epitomised in this poster by the apparent disregard for the material appeal of capitalism. Symbols of capitalist greed, such as rich cloths and gold coins, lie beneath the feet of the surging workers in the bottom scene. The poster hence suggests that riches derived from capitalism are inferior to the unifying spiritual power of the Bolshevik cause. Parallel to the trampled symbols of capitalism in the bottom section, figures in the top section of the poster walk upon a manmade path that rests on the crumpled, naked bodies of the masses. The fact that the path rests not on the ground, as in the Bolshevik version, but on man itself, subtly highlights the natural, grounded nature of Communism. Contrastingly, the representation of the Orthodox scene is unnatural and repressive, supported by capitalist exploitation.

In this sense, the Bolshevik state, through Dmitrii Moor's poster, denounces the Russian Orthodox Church for its links to tsarist capitalism. Considering 'Rozhdestvo' in isolation, the Bolsheviks' communication of their antireligious campaign here focuses less upon an explanation of Marxist ideology and more upon the Russian Orthodox Church's historical links to capitalist and tsarist oppression.

6. 'Letter to Molotov for Politburo Members', 19 March 1922

Responding to events in Shuia, on 19 March 1922 Lenin dictated a letter to his secretary addressed to Molotov, for members of the Politburo.⁵⁷ According to Richard Pipes, a week prior to this, residents had defended a church in the textile town of Shuia and prevented a communist raid.⁵⁸ Three days later, local officials brought in soldiers, who shot and killed four civilians in the resulting conflict.⁵⁹ In response, the government had suspended all actions against the Russian Orthodox Church on March 16; Lenin

⁵⁷ Richard Pipes and David Brandenberger (eds.) *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (London, 1996), 152-155.

⁵⁸ Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924*, 349.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 349.

categorically opposes this move in his highly confidential letter, published in translation in 1996 in *The Unknown Lenin*.⁶⁰

Throughout the document, Lenin's rhetoric is distinctly militant, identifying the Orthodox Church as a threat to the security of the Bolshevik Party. Perhaps a residual feature of the Civil War, Lenin encourages an 'us versus them' mentality, referring to the Church as 'the enemy'⁶¹ and an organised 'rebellion of slaveholders'.⁶² Ironically, Lenin claims that the Church's defence of its own 'valuables'⁶³ is unjustified. Characterising the Orthodox institution as the aggressor, he evidences Machiavelli's *Prince* to justify the brutality he proposes as a defence against the resistance of the Church to the confiscation of valuables.⁶⁴

Lenin stresses pragmatic factors that supposedly necessitate this brutality. He argues the strategic benefits of the 'desperate hunger'⁶⁵ of the Russian people, outlining its potential role in the campaign against the Orthodox Church. His apparent disregard for the suffering caused by the famine creates a decidedly harsh atmosphere within the document. Furthermore, repetition of the phrase, 'precisely at this moment'⁶⁶ reinforces the need for urgency, and is especially emphasised in relation to the punishment of those responsible for the Church's defence. He maintains that 'execution by firing squad of a very large number of the most influential and dangerous'⁶⁷ clergy members in Shuia and elsewhere should be performed 'with the maximum of speed'.⁶⁸ Most significantly, 'a detailed directive to the judicial authorities,

⁶⁰ Pipes and Brandenberger, *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, 152-155.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 154.

⁶³ Pipes and Brandenberger, *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, p. 153.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 153; Nicolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. W. K. Marriott (Florence, 1532), 8.

⁶⁵ Pipes and Brandenberger, *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, 153.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 154.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 154.

also verbal',⁶⁹ should ensure this outcome, exposing the illegality of the proposed action. Far from being ideologically motivated, Lenin's confidential directive to the Politburo is more authoritarian in nature than Marxist.

For this reason, Lenin's letter to Molotov is unsurprisingly marked 'Top Secret'.⁷⁰ Lenin also instructs Politburo members not to 'make copies for any reason'⁷¹ at the top of the document, and calls for numerous 'secret directive[s]'⁷² in the implementation of his planned policy. By limiting the circulation of the document, and ensuring the confidential instruction of the Politburo and secret police, Lenin ensures that the brutally opportunistic reasoning laid out in the document is not made public. Only with the opening of the archives was the letter made available, translated by Richard Pipes in *Unknown Lenin* in 1996.

Lenin's letter to Molotov and the Politburo offers a uniquely exclusive view into the background motivations behind the Bolsheviks' public declarations on religion during the antireligious campaign. Considering this source alone, Bolshevik policy into 1922 against the Russian Orthodox Church seems to draw entirely upon the pragmatic opportunity provided by the famine, rather than Marxist ideology. Historians such as James Ryan and Jonathan Daly support this explanation, when discussing this source.⁷³

7. 'Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo', 20 March 1922

At a meeting of the Politburo on 20 March 1922, Lev Kamenev, Josef Stalin, Leon Trotsky and Vyacheslav Molotov, in Lenin's absence, devised a 'protocol'⁷⁴ for the continuation of the antireligious campaign. The document outlines a coherent plan, aimed mainly at provincial party administration, for coordinated action in the

⁶⁹ Ibid., 154.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 152.

⁷¹ Ibid., 152.

⁷² Ibid., 154.

⁷³ Ryan, *Lenin's Terror*, 178.

⁷⁴ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 27.

confiscation of church valuables.⁷⁵ It forms part of Felix Corley's collection of documents in *Religion in the Soviet Union*, 'all but a handful of which have never appeared in English'.⁷⁶ The protocol has only become available since the opening of the archives, a process that started in the 1980s.⁷⁷ 'Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo' as historical source provides valuable insight into the mechanics of Bolshevik policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church, especially its filtration from the federal level to local administration.

Until the opening of archives, the document's readership was limited to Party officials across Russia, in order to communicate the Soviet government's plan for the coordinated confiscation church valuables in 1922. Primarily, the Politburo stressed the need for the action to seem spontaneous and popular, rather than governmentally imposed. Therefore, the protocol emphasises the confidentiality of the actions it proposes. Though the pretense of spontaneity must be maintained, the source instructs localities to conduct a number of measures during the build up to the seizure of valuables. Amongst other stipulations, the document calls for the coordination of 'an unofficial week of agitation and preliminary organization for the confiscation of valuables (without of course announcing such a week)⁷⁸ with the added security of the presence of 'soldiers'.⁷⁹ The deliberate build up to the assault on the churches reveals the Bolshevik authorities' meticulous planning of the campaign, as well as their focus upon the image of the policy's popularity.

This emphasis on image is extended, drawing upon Lenin's suggestion in his letter sent the day before,⁸⁰ to include the famine. The Politburo involves the

⁷⁵ Vyacheslav Molotov, 'Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo', in: Felix Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader* (Basingstoke, 1996), 27-29.

⁷⁶ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 2.

⁷⁷ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 1.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸⁰ Pipes and Brandenberger, *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, 152-155.

‘starving’⁸¹ in its campaign, suggesting the creation of ‘placards: “Church valuables to save the lives of the starving”’,⁸² together with the presentation of ‘representatives of the starving demanding the speedy confiscation of valuables’⁸³ wherever possible. In this way, the Politburo’s protocol employs mass hunger as a propaganda tool in order to justify the seizure of Orthodox valuables, reinforcing the brutal objectivity and pragmatism that was evident in Lenin’s letter. The priorities of the Bolshevik Party are thus exposed: rather than using the confiscation of valuables as a pretext for alleviating the famine, the famine is used as a pretext for a further assault on the Russian Orthodox Church’s prestige.

In order to prevent ‘chauvinist agitation’⁸⁴ that could arise, the Politburo advises against the campaign’s association with certain groups. Identifying ‘Jews and, perhaps, Latvians’⁸⁵ especially, the document bars these groups from official commissions for the confiscation of valuables. As evidenced by a passage from *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, many Russians associated the Bolshevik party with Judaism,⁸⁶ therefore the Politburo in 1922 was anxious not to perpetuate this association in its persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church. Aside from religious associations, the exclusion of Latvians from the campaign relates to the Civil War, during which Latvia officially opposed the Bolsheviks, fighting alongside the Whites.⁸⁷ Despite their official position, there was a large number of Latvian Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia; 2.53 percent of Communist Party members in 1922 were Latvians,⁸⁸ which was awkward for a Bolshevik government that had just secured its victory over the White army. The Politburo was

⁸¹ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 28.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 28.

⁸³ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 28.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁸⁶ Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, v.

⁸⁷ Andrejs Plakans, *The Latvians: A Short History* (Stanford, 1995), 119.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 120.

therefore also conscious of the individual perpetrators of the confiscation of valuables, and the message they sent in relation to the values of the Party and state.

The Bolshevik central authorities were also seemingly concerned with the individual targets of the confiscations. The document suggests that each locality ‘promote a schism among the clergy’⁸⁹ over the seizure of valuables, not dissimilar to the more universal attempt ‘to divide and subvert the established Church’⁹⁰ through the formation of the Living Church in the same year. Article seven lays out the ideal portrayal of this schism, denouncing those opposing the confiscation of valuables as ‘inhuman and avaricious’⁹¹, whilst taking care to detach the agitation of communists from that of ‘loyal priests’.⁹² From this, the source reveals the Soviet government’s aim to instil a divide between loyal and hostile clergy members, whilst maintaining distance between the Party and sympathetic priests, so as to maintain its atheist image.

The confidential Party document not only outlines the tasks of local Party officials in aid of the drive to confiscate of valuables from Russian Orthodox institutions, but in doing so also provides insight into the reasoning behind its advertisement of the policy. In a more abstract sense, the source reveals the Bolsheviks’ increased reliance upon opportunism in the formation and broadcast of the campaign against the Russian Orthodox faith. Using the famine as an opportunity to subtly create a divide within the Orthodox Church, the source is indicative of Soviet opportunism in its conception of antireligious policy.

⁸⁹ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 27.

⁹⁰ Pipes, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924*, 362.

⁹¹ Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader*, 28.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 28.

8. 'Grazhdane!', 1922



Figure 2.93

State publishers issued a poster in Moscow in 1922, illustrated by the artists Mikhail Mikhailovich Cheremnykh and Vladimir Mayakovsky. In the 1970s a copy was donated to the New York Public Library Digital Collections by Harold Fleming, and was then digitised in 2013. The Bolsheviks address the poster to ‘grazhdane’, or ‘citizens’, and call for their support during the confiscation of valuables from Russian Orthodox establishments. The focus of this appeal is the famine, and the poster asserts that ‘the people are in need; the people are within their rights to take [the Church’s valuables]. In doing so, we are taking away all undeserved wealth and are giving bread to the starving’.⁹⁴

The portrayal of the Orthodox Church’s wealth is juxtaposed by images of starvation. A representative of the clergy in the seventh panel is pictured with drink and decorative flowers, whereas a mother and child in panel ten are surrounded by

⁹³ Mikhail Mikhailovich Cheremnykh and Vladimir Mayakovsky, ‘Grazhdane!’, 1922. Available at: <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-4030-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>.

⁹⁴ Ibid. Translation my own.

nothing but planks of wood. Textually, this comparison is reinforced in the title: 'we are poor. But there are piles of valuables in churches and cathedrals'.⁹⁵ By alluding to the apparently exorbitant wealth of the Orthodox Church, as an organisation it is characterised as greedy and indifferent to the general suffering and poverty of the Russian population during the famine.

Extending the criticism of church wealth, the cartoon images on the poster maintain a clear link between the Orthodox Church and capitalist exploitation. In panel six, the Patriarch swings a thurible, which burns incense during worship,⁹⁶ in the direction of a man in uniform, presumably a military leader. The Patriarch is the highest authority in the Russian Orthodox faith; his implied worship of the military figure undermines the power that this position should connote. In panel seven, similarly, the Patriarch dines with a man in a suit and top hat, presumably a capitalist. The dining table here, however, is a gold cannon, and the caption reads, 'under the tsars, gold was seized to fund wars'.⁹⁷ Comparatively, the text under panel five begins, 'if this gold could be used to fund the purchase of bread' and is supplemented by an image of a worker standing next to a building named 'Agricultural School'.⁹⁸ The poster in this way questions the selflessness of religious faith, arguing that the Church wastes its gold in courtship of capitalism, rather than in aid of relieving the famine.

The Church is implicated in the capitalist exploitation of the masses,⁹⁹ as argued within *The Communist Manifesto*. This exploitation is demonstrated explicitly in the eleventh panel, in which an overweight man in a suit and top hat, holding a whip, sits upon the shoulders of a thin worker. The visual metaphor for the bourgeois exploitation of the working classes is extended, including another the image of the Patriarch as he receives the Bible from the bourgeois figure. This scene strengthens the desired

⁹⁵ Cheremnykh and Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!' Translation my own.

⁹⁶ John Anthony McGuckin, *Standing in God's Holy Fire* (London, 2001).

⁹⁷ Cheremnykh and Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!'

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 18.

association between Russian Orthodoxy and capitalism; the Church is portrayed to have its theological basis in the capitalist system.

Offsetting the characterisation of the Church, the poster also conveys the purity of the working class. The Russian population in the poster is represented by three figures, in panels five, ten and eleven, all dressed in white, which commonly connotes innocence and purity. This depiction corresponds to the idealised Bolshevik concept of the class of the proletariat as the model for communist society.

Aside from the romanticised image of the proletariat, the poster also conveys an implicit image of the Bolshevik party. In panels one and nine, an image of a pointed finger is visible, which can be inferred to symbolise the authoritative presence of the Bolshevik Party. In both scenes the hand acts as an accuser, asking the Church if it has any gold in the first panel and in the ninth seems to force a member of the clergy to donate his gold. Both instances demonstrate the superiority of the Bolshevik Party over the Church.

The combination of the portraits of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian proletariat and the Bolshevik Party here serve to convey the poster's purpose. The Soviet publication, representative of the public communication of antireligious policy, indicates the Party's desire to sever the traditional relationship between the Church and the Russian lower classes, in particular.

8. Conclusion

Studying the chronology of Soviet antireligious policy up to 1922 reveals the intensification of the Bolshevik attitude towards the Russian Orthodox Church. Using Lenin's early theory on religion as the closest model to authentic Bolshevik religious ideology, subsequent Soviet declarations comparatively reveal an increasing reliance upon ideological pragmatism in order to further the persecution of the Church. This trend, however, should be considered realistically; ideological theory alone could not have dictated Bolshevik policy, especially during the Civil War when its position was so tenuous.

Nevertheless, the Soviet government relied heavily upon opportunism when dealing with the Orthodox Church, especially in its propaganda. The use of starvation as an advertising strategy in 'Grazhdane!'¹⁰⁰, as earlier proposed by Lenin in his letter to Molotov,¹⁰¹ is perhaps a more obvious example of Bolshevik opportunism. Additionally, however, state publications detailed a relationship between the organisation of Russian Orthodoxy and capitalism, equating this relationship to the Church's support of war in both 'Rozhdestvo'¹⁰² and 'Grazhdane!'¹⁰³. The Soviets attempted to draw support away from the Orthodox Church by subtly blaming the religious organisation for conflict in Russia, which was war-weary from the combined experience of the First World War and Russian Civil War. This reliance upon contemporary circumstance characterised government publications, especially in 1922.

Comparing specific sources provides a more direct analysis of the shift in Soviet policy. The decree of 1919 on religious freedom¹⁰⁴ contrasts the severity of the Politburo's protocol in 1922.¹⁰⁵ The earlier declaration emphasises the freedom of faith, though in actuality it severs the Church's official ties to society and the state. Many of its stipulations, though focused on eliminating the influence enjoyed by the Russian Orthodox institution under tsarism,¹⁰⁶ also correspond directly to the ideological argument set out in 'The Attitude of The Workers' Party to Religion'.¹⁰⁷ The Politburo's protocol, issued in 1922 to local Soviet councils, by contrast, seems to act as a direct response to events in Shuia, employing the famine as a tool for the justification of the confiscation of Church valuables. The shift in basis from one of ideology to

¹⁰⁰ Cheremnykh and Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!'.

¹⁰¹ Pipes and Brandenberger, *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, 152-155.

¹⁰² Moor, 'Rozhdestvo'.

¹⁰³ Cheremnykh and Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!'.

¹⁰⁴ Council of People's Commissars 'Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies', 34-35.

¹⁰⁵ Molotov, 'Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo', 27-29.

¹⁰⁶ Victor Williams, 'Review of Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia by Walter Laqueur', *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 41(1993), p. 680.

¹⁰⁷ Marx et al, *Marxism, Socialism and Religion*, 88-97.

opportunities provided by circumstance is a key element in the progression of Soviet policy.

Similarly, a comparison of the two posters 'Rozhdestvo'¹⁰⁸ and 'Grazhdane!'¹⁰⁹, published in 1921 and 1922 respectively, reveal a shift in Bolshevik attitude that is apparent even within the short time frame. Though both depict the relationship between the Orthodox Church and capitalist exploitation, the shift is evidenced by the focus of each publication. 'Rozhdestvo'¹¹⁰ focuses on the corruption of Orthodox faith, providing a Bolshevik ideological alternative. 'Grazhdane!',¹¹¹ however, does not point out Bolshevik ideology as an alternative to religious faith, focusing on the Church's wealth instead. Arguing that the Church does not do enough to contribute to the alleviation of the famine, the state-issued poster provides an alternative use for Russian Orthodox gold: the alleviation of the famine. By shifting its focus away from ideology and onto more pragmatic motivations, the Soviet government attempted to portray the Church as a scapegoat, revealing a more general move to intensify the persecution of the Orthodox religion.

Setting the sources within the context of historiographical debate, the issue of the Russian population's reception of Soviet policy comes into consideration. The portfolio as a whole provides limited first hand insight into the public reception of the campaign, due to limited material, as well as a primary focus on formation of policy, rather than public response. 'From a Russian Diary: 1917 - 1920'¹¹² does, however, illuminate the state of confusion in the provinces, regarding both religious policy and Soviet policy in general, which lends support to the revisionist school of historiography on this issue.¹¹³ This study provides limited scope for commentary regarding the specific

¹⁰⁸ Moor, 'Rozhdestvo'.

¹⁰⁹ Cheremnykh and Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!'.

¹¹⁰ Moor, 'Rozhdestvo'.

¹¹¹ Cheremnykh and Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!'.

¹¹² Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920*, 123-125.

¹¹³ Fireside, *Icon and the Swastika*.

reception of the campaign, but does provide a solid foundation for an informed discussion, presenting the necessary context for debate.

The source portfolio, on the other hand, is instrumental in the discussion of Lenin's character. The study of the progression of Soviet antireligious policy in many ways acts as a microcosm for the study of the progression of Lenin's approach to leadership. In a broad sense, Lenin's increased tendency towards ideological pragmatism is epitomised by the discrepancy between the arguments of 'The Attitude of The Workers' Party to Religion'¹¹⁴ in 1909 and his letter to Molotov in 1922.¹¹⁵ Again, however, here the changing situation within Russia skews this simplified argument. Marxist theory denounces religion as a tool of bourgeois manipulation, but remains vague in its strategy to eliminate religious influence once communism is established.¹¹⁶ Essentially, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had no ideological protocol for the elimination of religious faith; the increased reliance upon pragmatism in Lenin's approaches to religion could be thus justified. With this in mind, a reliable discussion of Lenin's character in a general sense cannot be based solely on his approach to religion. Nevertheless, considering the study of Soviet antireligious policy in the context of Lenin's personality does reveal his capacity for ideological pragmatism and brutality.

As a whole, the portfolio of sources suggests a discrepancy between Soviet conceptualisation of its policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church and the corresponding communication of this policy towards the public. Significantly, Soviet policy has its roots in a Marxist opposition to religion. However, in the communication of their campaign, the Bolsheviks seem to focus more upon opportunistic associations that undermine the credibility of the institution of the Orthodox Church, rather than lessons on materialism and atheism, as purported by Lenin in 1909.¹¹⁷ This tendency towards opportunism is also increasingly reflected in the conception of the campaign by the Soviet leadership. Founded on the concept that 'religious belief [was] a relic of

¹¹⁴ Marx, Engels, Lenin, Luxemburg, Trotsky, *Marxism, Socialism and Religion*, 88-97.

¹¹⁵ Pipes and Brandenberger, *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, 152-155.

¹¹⁶ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 26.

¹¹⁷ Marx et al, *Marxism, Socialism and Religion*, 91.

primitive times that stood in the way of modernisation',¹¹⁸ the Bolshevik government's antireligious campaign from 1918 to 1922 was conceptualised and implemented with the acute awareness of pragmatic opportunities.

Bibliography

1. PRIMARY SOURCES

- Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920* (London, 1921), Cheremnykh, Mikhail Mikhailovich and Vladimir Mayakovsky, 'Grazhdane!', 1922. Available at: <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-4030-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>.
- Council of People's Commissars 'Decree on the Freedom of Conscience, and of Church and Religious Societies, in: Szczesniak, Boleslaw (ed.), *The Russian Revolution and Religion: A Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925* (Notre Dame, 1959), 34-35.
- Marx, Karl, Frederick Engels, V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, 'The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion' in: Resistance Books (ed.) *Marxism, Socialism and Religion* (Chippendale, 2001), 88-97.
- Molotov, Vyacheslav, 'Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo', in: Felix Corley, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader* (Basingstoke, 1996), 27-29.
- Moor, Dmitrii Stakhievich, 'Rozhdestvo' 1921. Available at <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/510d47da-4060-a3d9-e040-e00a18064a99>.
- Pipes, Richard, and David Brandenberger (eds.), *Unknown Lenin From the Secret Archive*, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (London, 1996), p.152-155.
- Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, 'Revealing the Remains of St Sergius', 1919. Available at: <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1917-2/conflict-with-the-church/conflict-with-the-church-video/revealing-the-remains-of-st-sergius-1919/>.

2. SECONDARY SOURCES

- Anon., *From a Russian Diary: 1917-1920* (London, 1921).
- Bourdeaux, Michael, *Opium of the People: The Christian Religion in the USSR* (Oxford, 1965).

¹¹⁸ Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924*, 338.

- Corley, Felix, *Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader* (Basingstoke, 1996).
- Eklof, Ben, 'Russian Literacy Campaigns 1861-1939', in: Robert F. Arnove and Harvey J. Graff (eds.) *National Literacy Campaigns and Movements: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (New Brunswick, 2008), 128-29.
- Fireside, Harvey, *Icon and the Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control* (Massachusetts, 1971).
- Hachette, 'John Murray: The UK's oldest publishing house'. Available at <https://www.hachette.co.uk/Articles/Group+Company+Info+Pages/John+Murray+info+page.page>.
- Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. W. K. Marriott, (Florence, 1532).
- Marx, Karl, Frederick Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, ed. Samuel Moore and Frederick Engels. Available online at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf>.
- Maynard, John, *The Russian Peasant and Other Studies* (Suffolk, 1942).
- McGuckin, John Anthony, *Standing in God's Holy Fire* (London, 2001).
- New York Public Library Digital Collections, 'Harold M. Fleming Papers, 1917-1971: Posters'. Available at <http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/collections/harold-m-fleming-papers-1917-1971-posters#!/?tab=about>.
- Pipes, Richard, *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime 1919-1924* (London, 1994).
- Plakans, Andrejs, *The Latvians: A Short History* (Stanford, 1995).
- Pospelovsky, Dmitri, *Soviet Anti-Religious Campaigns and Persecutions*, 3 vols. (Volume 2; Basingstoke, 1988).
- Possony, Stefan, *Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary* (Chicago, 1964).
- Read, Christopher, *Lenin: A Revolutionary Life: A Post-Soviet Re-evaluation* (London, 2005).
- Reed, John, *Ten Days That Shook The World*, new edition (Aylesbury, 1977).
- Ryan, James, *Lenin's Terror* (Abingdon, 2012).
- Service, Robert, *Lenin: A Biography* (Harvard, 2000).

- Szczesniak, Boleslaw, *The Russian Revolution and Religion: A Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925* (Notre Dame, 1959).
- Ulam, Adam, *The Bolsheviks* (Harvard, 1998).
- Volkogonov, Dmitri, *Lenin Life and Legacy*, Harold Shukman (ed. and trans.) (London, 1994).
- Williams, Victor, 'Review of Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia by Walter Laqueur', *The American Journal of Comparative Law* 41(1993), 678-685.
- Wynot, Jennifer, *Keeping the Faith: Russian Orthodox Monasticism in the Soviet Union, 1917-1939* (Texas, 2004).

BU
HA

The British Undergraduate
Historical Association

© 2016